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1. Introduction 
In recent years, following the financial crisis and pressure from civil society, gov-
ernments of many countries have agreed on new legal tools to tackle tax evasion 
and avoidance and to reduce harmful tax competition, with the objective of 
fighting the growing inequalities within and in between many societies. Among 
these legal tools figures for example the automatic exchange of information of fi-
nancial account data. In the realm of corporate tax avoidance, multinational en-
terprises are now required to produce so-called country by country reports, 
which give tax administrations data to better evaluate tax risks. However, rules 
and regulation are toothless if there are not sufficient resources available for im-
plementing them. In order to evaluate progress (or regress) and to compare 
countries, it is therefore necessary to also take the dimension of administration 
and enforcement into account. In that context, the COFFERS research project on 
the capacity of tax administrations to fight inequalities in the European Union 
aims to generate a comprehensive comparative analysis of administrative and 
enforcement capacity.   
1.1 Linking tax administration capacity to inequality 
Two important tools for governments to reduce inequality are progressive taxa-
tion and progressive spending, i.e. to apply a higher tax rate to people with a 
higher ability to pay than others, and to spend public funds in a way that ad-
dresses the needs of people with low income or wealth. The tax administration’s 
role is to collect sufficient revenue to fund progressive spending and to make 
sure that all taxpayers contribute to government funding according to the tax 
code.  
Several factors may hinder tax administrations from collecting all the taxes that 
are due: a failure to collect outstanding tax debt, the non-detection of tax eva-
sion or tax avoidance, a lack of capacity to audit the tax returns of legal entities 
and individuals, lack of clarity of the tax law, or a failure to engage in (strategic) 
litigation. Finally, political interference or “state capture” could cause all the 
above hurdles, by unduly interfering in policy making, tax administration or judi-
cial systems. Politicians could use their influence on the capacity of tax admin-
istrations and deliberately reduce capacity (e.g. through low budget allocation) 
as a tool for attracting profit bookings, investment 1 or votes 2.  
Efforts of the tax administration should not only concentrate on maximizing reve-
nue collection and, with regards to inequality, on equal treatment of taxpayers 
                                        
1 Markus Meinzer, Steueroase Deutschland. Warum Bei Uns Viele Reiche Keine Steuern Zahlen (München, 
2015), 144–85. 
2 Alejandro Esteller-Moré, ‘Is the Tax Administration Just a Money Machine? Empirical Evidence on Redistribu-
tive Politics’, Economics of Governance, 12/3 (2011), 275–99. 
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and on reducing the overall tax gap, but especially on making sure that the prin-
ciple of progressive taxation is respected: those with a greater ability to pay 
should pay a greater amount than those with lesser ability to pay 3. It is espe-
cially important that those taxpayers with a high ability to pay are not left out 
from enforcement – even though enforcing rules on them might be more difficult 
than on other taxpayers. If tax rules are not properly enforced, then a system 
which appears to be progressive, might become de facto regressive. 
 
1.2 What is administrative capacity and how to measure it? 
Administrative capacity could be broadly defined as the means that an admin-
istration disposes of to fulfil its mission. How can one tell apart which country’s 
tax administration has a high capacity and which hasn’t?  
Gäde concludes that there are three broad different types of approaches to 
measure administrative capacity, namely input-, output- and perception-based 
approaches.  
Perception based approaches measure capacity by assessing how capable indi-
viduals think a tax administration is. An example of such a measure is the ques-
tion from the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Survey: “Is tax 
evasion in your country minimal?”, which was referred to corporate executives in 
a given country, and which has been used as a measure for tax compliance by 
one study 4.  
The problem is that perception based indicators are at risk of reinforcing existing 
stereotypes or biases that exist in epistemic or other surveyed communities, as 
discussed for example by Cobham (2013) or Christensen (2007), and do not nec-
essarily overcome the problems around comparability of survey data across juris-
dictions and cultural contexts and traditions. 
Output indicators try to measure a result, in this case the extent to which a tax 
administration fulfils its mission. Output indicators of tax administration capacity 
that have been used are for example the total tax revenue collected 5 or the ac-
tual tax revenue assessed or collected as percentage of an estimated potential 
tax revenue (tax gap)6. 
                                        
3 Fiscalis 2020 Tax Gap Project Group, The Concept of Tax Gaps. Report on VAT Gap Estimations. (Brussels, 
2016), 13 <https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/docs/body/tgpg_report_en.pdf> [ac-
cessed 17 July 2018]. 
4 Leslie Robinson and Joel Slemrod, ‘Understanding Multidimensional Tax Systems’, International Tax and Pub-
lic Finance, 19/2 (2012), 253f. 
5 Gordana Savić and others, ‘Impact of the Efficiency of the Tax Administration on Tax Evasion’, Economic Re-
search-Ekonomska Istraživanja, 28/1 (2015), 1138–48. 
6 Theodore Black and others, Federal Tax Compliance Research: Tax Year 2006 Tax Gap Estimation (Washing-
ton, DC, 2012) <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/06rastg12workppr.pdf> [accessed 7 January 2014]. 
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The basic issue with regards to output indicators is the difficulty to isolate tax ad-
ministration capacity from other variables such as, for example, tax policy, eco-
nomic performance or tax morale and thus the multitude of factors beyond the 
direct control of tax administrations that need to be included in analysis. 
Controlling factors that should be taken into account are for example differences 
in tax structure (e.g. different taxes administered at different levels of govern-
ment), organisation (for example one centralized tax administration against sev-
eral organisations), functions attributed to the tax administration (administering 
only taxes, or also tariffs and social contributions?), as well as tax policy and pri-
orities 7. Other factors beyond the immediate scope of tax administrations could 
be the complexity of tax policy, i.e. if policies contain more special exemptions 
and loopholes, which often reinforce inequality as economically advantaged 
group are often able to negotiate these exemptions. On the other hand, tax eva-
sion and tax avoidance are probably lowest if tax rates are zero or near zero 
(and by definition the tax code would be very uncomplex). In that case, the com-
pliance gap would not be a good indicator of high capacity of the tax administra-
tion but rather of a low capacity of tax policy to combat inequality. 
While it is possible to use some of these factors as control variables in a study 
that seeks to analyse the performance of tax administrations, it would be difficult 
to control all these factors at the same time.  
Further, some relevant output indicators might not be linked to observable inputs 
in the same jurisdiction. For example, with regards to mutual administrative as-
sistance in tax matters, levels of tax evasion (and therefore of inequality) depend 
to some extent on the administrative capacity of other jurisdictions, who have 
the responsibility of gathering data on foreign accounts from their banks and 
other financial institutions. In that case, the capacity of one tax administration 
influences the output measure of the tax administration of another jurisdiction. 
Input indicators are measures of the tools that administrations have at hand to 
achieve their missions. These are for example budget, human resources, IT sys-
tems, specific legal powers and safeguards. The principal issue with input indica-
tors is that without robust output indicators, it is difficult to measure which in-
puts are actually relevant. Further, they might be subject to problems of the 
“hen/egg” type. One study found that high enforcement capacities with regards 
to withholding taxes correlate with high levels of non-compliance8 9, suggesting 
that in countries with a high level of honesty among taxpayers and a high level 
                                        
7 EUROSAI, Benchmarking of Tax Administrations. Report of the EUROSAI Study Group, 2008 <https://www.eu-
rosai.org/export/sites/eurosai/.content/documents/training/training-committe/Benchmarking-of-Tax-Admin-
istrationsFinal-Report.pdf> [accessed 25 July 2018]. 
8 This was however the study mentioned above, which relied on a perception-based indicator for measuring 
non-compliance. 
9 Robinson and Slemrod, ‘Understanding Multidimensional Tax Systems’, 253f. 
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of voluntary compliance, the tax administration is endowed with less enforce-
ment powers, since it supposedly does not need them. In that case, input indica-
tors still measure the capacity of a tax administration, but it is difficult to com-
pare countries based on input indicators only and to derive conclusions and rec-
ommendations on it, as the reasons for high/low capacity might not be the same. 
One strategy to overcome these problems for measuring administrative capacity 
or indeed performance consists in establishing and testing hypotheses through a 
large number of both input and output variables. The purpose of this study is 
thus to gather more comprehensive input data on tax administration capacity 
and what could be called intermediate outputs (such as for example the number 
of audits or administrative penalties that an administration imposes) based on 
theoretical considerations. These new indicators could then be included in more 
comprehensive studies. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that a number of studies10 have calculated the ef-
ficiency of tax administration in combining several inputs (such as, for example, 
budget or staff) into output indicators (such as tax collection or reduction of the 
tax gap). This is, however, not the most relevant type of indicator with regards 
to gauging the capacity of tax administrations to effectively fighting inequality. It 
is the classical difference between efficiency (maximising the impact with a given 
set of inputs) and effectiveness (achieving a specific result with whatever re-
sources or inputs are necessary).  
Finally, the accuracy, robustness and relevance of measures relying both on in-
put and output-based indicators depend to a large extent on data availability and 
quality. Reviewing the data available and suggesting further indicators that 
would need to be considered is the purpose of the following chapters. 
2. Scope of data on tax administrations 
Existing empirical data and evaluation tools on tax administration can be broadly 
categorized into 1) national level, single jurisdiction data and 2) multiple jurisdic-
tion datasets, compiled by international and/or regional organisations, or in the 
case of USAID, by a single national organisation. There is currently no overview 
of the first type of data sources known to the authors, and we discuss briefly the 
second type below.  
Different tools for the comparative assessment of the performance of tax admin-
istrations have been developed by international organisations over the last dec-
ade. Some of these are used by bilateral development organisations for evaluat-
ing the impact of official development assistance programs. Often, these tools 
                                        
10 For example James Alm and Denvil Duncan, ‘Estimating Tax Agency Efficiency’, Public Budgeting & Finance, 
34/3 (2014), 92–110. or Maria Katharaki and Marios Tsakas, ‘Assessing the Efficiency and Managing the Perfor-
mance of Greek Tax Offices’, Journal of Advances in Management Research, 7/1 (2010), 58–75. 
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have had short life cycles, have been carried out only in a few countries, and 
have seldom published the results of the assessments, let alone the underlying 
data. Thus, on a worldwide basis it is for the moment difficult to compare juris-
dictions with each other and over time. Nevertheless, with regards to OECD and 
EU countries the coverage of publicly available data is gradually improving as 
shown below. 
2.1 Initiatives by international organisations 
In the last decade several international workstreams focusing on collecting tax 
administration data were developed, and have by now been coordinated into one 
big data collection project:  
The Tax Administration report of the OECD’s Forum on Tax Administration is pub-
lished every 2 years since 2004 and has undergone substantial change over the 
years. While covering only OECD members in 200411, its coverage has been ex-
panded to include 20 non-OECD countries in its latest issue in 201712. Since 
2013, it includes all EU and G20 member states. Data is usually gathered 
through a survey. All data collected is usually made public as annex to the re-
port. Since the latest edition (2017), the data is made available as MS Excel ta-
ble13.  
The other international initiative to collect tax administration data is RA-FIT 
(Revenue Administration Fiscal Information Tool). This initiative emanated from 
the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Fiscal Affairs Department technical as-
sistance work and their practice to send surveys ahead of diagnostic missions to 
the respective revenue administrations14. Out of these practices, RA-FIT was de-
veloped. It comprised a survey questionnaire that was for the first time in 2012 
sent to 120 IMF member countries. Round 2 commenced in May 201415 and was 
completed by 89 countries16. The data collected by the RA-FIT module however is 
not published in a country level breakdown for most countries/regions. 
One notable exception to the above surveys is Latin America, for which the Inter-
American Center of Tax Administrations (CIAT) coordinated and provided data for 
                                        
11 OECD, Tax Administration in OECD Countries: Comparative Information Series (2004), 2004 
<https://www.oecd.org/ctp/administration/CIS-2004.pdf> [accessed 29 March 2017]. 
12 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Tax Administration 2015. Comparative Infor-
mation on OECD and Other Advanced and Emerging Economies (Paris, 2015) <http://www.keepeek.com/Digi-
tal-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/tax-administration-2015_tax_admin-2015-en#page1> [accessed 9 Janu-
ary 2015]. 
13 To be accessed here: https://qdd.oecd.org/subject.aspx?Subject=TAS 
14 Andrea Lemgruber, Andrew Masters and Duncan Cleary, Understanding Revenue Administration: An Initial 
Data Analysis Using the Revenue Administration Fiscal Information Tool (Washington, DC, USA, 2015), 3 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dp/2015/fad1501.pdf> [accessed 29 March 2017]. 
15 Lemgruber, Masters and Cleary, Understanding Revenue Administration, 5. 
16 International Monetary Fund, Tax Policy And Administration Trust Fund Annual Report 2016, 2016, 18 
<https://www.imf.org/external/np/ins/english/pdf/2016ar.pdf> [accessed 29 March 2017]. 
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the first round of surveys, feeding into RA-FIT. CIAT’s own work on tax admin-
istrations in Latin America was an important precursor to RA-FIT, and CIAT pub-
lished a report in 2012 jointly with the Inter-American Development Bank and a 
regional IMF office, that contained standardized, detailed questions and country 
level data for the years 2006-201017. In 2016, CIAT published a detailed report 
including country level breakdowns on the results of the 2nd RA-FIT round18. 
For 2017, a collaboration between the OECD, CIAT, the Intra-European Organisa-
tion of Tax Administrations (IOTA) and the IMF has begun to jointly collect data 
on tax administrations through ISORA (International Survey on Revenue Admin-
istration), and which would replace the particular workstreams of each organisa-
tion. In their communique of the 10th Meeting of the Forum on Tax Administra-
tion in Beijing on 13 May 2016, this new collaborative endeavour was labelled “a 
milestone in international collaboration, cost reduction and efficiency ultimately 
delivering a comparative data set for over 150 tax administrations from around 
the world”19, a view echoed by the International Monetary Fund (2017: 16). The 
OECD based the 2017 edition of its Tax Administration report (see above) on the 
data collected via this survey and published the data collected on 55 member 
states of OECD, EU and G2020. According to the OECD, some terms were defined 
so that data could be best compared across jurisdictions. However, this has al-
tered some definitions of previous OECD Tax Administration survey, so that an 
over-time comparison is not possible for all variables anymore21. 
In general, however, the publication of reports based on and including the under-
lying data collected through ISORA is likely to remain under the sole responsibil-
ity of each member country, so that no comprehensive dataset on all 150 tax ad-
ministrations is currently publicly accessible. Apart from the OECD, no organisa-
tion has published a report with freely accessible data from ISORA. Nevertheless, 
at least with regards to OECD, EU and G20 member states, this report represents 
a large improvement in terms of data availability. A caveat remains a relatively 
                                        
17 Fernando Diaz Yubero and Miguel Pecho, State of the Tax Administration in Latin America: 2006-2010, Inter-
American Center of Tax Administrations, CIAT / Inter-American Development Bank, IDB / Regional Technical 
Assistance Center for Central America, Panama and Dominican Republic CAPTAC-DR, IMF, 2012 <https://publi-
cations.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/3506/State%20of%20the%20TA%20in%20LATAM%202006-
2010.pdf?sequence=7> [accessed 29 March 2017]. 
18 Luis Alberto Arias, Las Administraciones de Ingresos En América Latina y El Caribe 2011-2013, Centro Intera-
mericano de Administraciones Tributarias CIAT, 2016 <https://ciatorg-public.sharepoint.com/biblioteca/Docu-
mentosTecnicos/Espanol/2016_Estado_AT_ALC_2011-2013.pdf> [accessed 29 March 2017]. 
19 OECD Forum on Tax Administration, Communiqué of the 10th Meeting of the OECD Forum on Tax Administra-
tion (FTA) (Beijing, 13 May 2016), 2 <www.oecd.org/tax/forum-on-tax-administration/meetings/fta-commu-
nique-2016.pdf> [accessed 24 March 2017]. 
20 OECD, Tax Administration 2017, Tax Administration (2017) <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/tax-ad-
ministration-2017_tax_admin-2017-en> [accessed 5 October 2017]. 
21 OECD, ‘Tax Administration Database’, 2018 <https://qdd.oecd.org/subject.aspx?Subject=TAS> [accessed 26 
July 2018]. 
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high number of item non-responses, i.e. many questions on subjects of interest 
were only answered by a small number of respondent jurisdictions.  
Thematically, the above-mentioned reports cover organisational aspects of tax 
administrations, practices regarding taxpayer registration, modes of return filing 
and payment, audits, details on human resources and budgets, and a range of 
other topics that relate to the performance of tax administration. 
The topics covered by the ISORA database were taken as base for the selection 
of further questions included in our survey. 
2.2 Initiatives by the European Union 
European Union institutions have also undertaken some work in the field of tax 
administration: 
The European Commission publishes every year a report on tax policy based on a 
survey22. It covers mainly issues of policy such as the tax mix, incidence of cer-
tain taxes, and tax policies’ effect on issues such as economic growth, job crea-
tion or inequality. It nevertheless assesses some aspects of tax administration 
such as for example the digitalisation of tax administration. 
Further, the European Commission has issued the “Fiscal Blueprints” in 200723, 
which is basically a questionnaire that can be used by individual tax administra-
tions for self-assessment. However, the European Commission has not collected 
any comparative data on the questions contained in the “Fiscal Blueprints”. 
2.3 Other notable research and data sources 
TADAT (Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool) is the latest effort to 
create an integrated evaluation tool of the performance and development of a 
tax administration in a collaborative manner, initiated 2011 by the International 
Monetary Fund (2013). It is supported by various bilateral donors and assessed 
mainly low income or lower middle-income countries (LICs and LMICs). While the 
first 17 pilot assessment have been completed in December 2015, and a further 
28 assessments have been completed in 2016 and 201724, only 13 summary as-
sessments have been published as of July 201825. The TADAT secretariat needs 
the permission of the reviewed jurisdiction to make a report public. The published 
                                        
22 European Commission, Tax Policies in the European Union. 2017 Survey (Brussels, 2017) <ec.europa.eu/taxa-
tion_customs/sites/taxation/files/tax_policies_survey_2017.pdf> [accessed 27 June 2018]. 
23 European Commission - Taxation and Customs Union, Fiscal Blueprints. A Path to a Robust, Modern and Effi-
cient Tax Administration, 2007 <ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/resources/docu-
ments/common/publications/info_docs/taxation/fiscal_blueprint_en.pdf> [accessed 27 March 2017]. 
24 www.tadat.org/files/tadatassessments.pdf; 20.07.2018. 
25 http://www.tadat.org/Field_Guide/PerformanceAssessmentReports.html; 20.07.2018. 
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reports contain the assessment results, and also provide some underlying data, 
in differing granularity. 
The Asian Development Bank published a report on tax administration capacity 
similar to the reports published by OECD and CIAT in 2014 with a revised version 
in 201626. However, country-level data was not made available, and no infor-
mation could be found on whether future reports will be conducted. 
To sum up, the exact extent of data gaps in the evaluation of the capacity of tax 
administrations is changing rapidly and the landscape of publicly available is 
gradually improving. Furthermore, there is currently no mapping available on the 
published statistics or public datasets by national tax administrations.  
As conversations with tax administration officials of various backgrounds confirm, 
and as experience with research into staffing levels of tax audit functions in Ger-
many has shown, a major obstacle is likely to consist in the sensitive nature and 
confidentiality of the data involved27. As tax is directly related to the core of 
statehood and sovereignty, it is often jealously guarded, and some jurisdictions 
may be unwilling to share data that may reveal shortcomings in sensitive func-
tions of tax administration.  
Furthermore, to our knowledge, specific issues that are relevant to inequality 
have not been assessed in any of the reviewed surveys. This report attempts at 
closing this gap. 
  
                                        
26 Asian Development Bank, A Comparative Analysis of Tax Administration in Asia and the Pacific: 2016, 2016 
<https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/193541/tax-admin-asia-pacific-2016.pdf> [accessed 10 
August 2018]. 
27 Meinzer, Steueroase Deutschland. Warum Bei Uns Viele Reiche Keine Steuern Zahlen. 
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3. Method 
 
3.1 Process 
Based on considerations explained below, a survey was designed and sent out to 
official email addresses of tax administrations of the 28 EU member countries 
(and to additional contact persons within the tax administrations) on 16 April 
2018. Surveys could be accessed as pdf, xlsx or docx file, together with a glos-
sary. A copy of the survey is enclosed as annex A, and the glossary is enclosed 
as annex B. A reminder email was sent to all 28 jurisdictions a week before the 
deadline, which was on 9 May 2018. Following the reception, emails with re-
quests for clarification or for additional data were sent out to respondent coun-
tries. 
3.2 Questionnaire 
The questionnaire consisted of nine topics with a total of 71 questions. On most 
questions, jurisdictions were asked to provide data for the years 2015 to 2017 so 
that trends could be analysed. The topics addressed in this questionnaire were 
chosen due to their relevancy for tax administrations’ role in containing and re-
ducing economic inequality and with the perspective of complementing data al-
ready collected by other surveys, mainly the International Survey on Revenue 
Administration (ISORA). As a result, issues that are relevant for countering ine-
quality by tax administrations, but which have already been covered by ISORA, 
were left out of our questionnaire28. 
As mentioned above, if tax policy is not properly enforced, then a system which 
is progressive on its face might become de facto regressive. Therefore, the ques-
tionnaire focuses on the capacity of administrations to enforce rules and to foster 
compliance. This includes topics on administrations’ practices in areas such as 
auditing, collecting penalties, prosecution, and the use of data received pursuant 
to automatic information exchange of financial account data and country by 
country reporting. Other questions rather focus on reasons which may lie behind 
a lack of efforts to enforce policies necessary to fight inequality. These include in-
stitutional choices, prioritization, and the risk of “state capture” by private inter-
ests. In this regard, the questionnaire asks questions on the protection of whis-
tleblowers, the staffing of Large Taxpayer Offices and High-Net-Wealth-Individu-
als units as well as the mobility of staff between public and private sectors. 
 
                                        
28 But data from ISORA was used to combine it and compare it with data gathered through our survey. 
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3.3 Responses received 
The following seven countries responded and sent back a filled-in questionnaire: 
Cyprus, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia29. This is a re-
sponse rate of 25%. Figure 1 below provides an overview of the responses to the 
survey. 
Several jurisdictions made use of notes to explain certain answers. In some 
cases, follow-up e-mails were exchanged with the respondents in order to clarify 
some issues with the data provided.  
 
Figure 1: Countries which responded to survey sent out to tax administrations of 28 EU member 
sates 
 
                                        
29 Additional countries responded to the request without filling in the questionnaire: Ireland, Denmark and the 
Netherlands responded they will not answer the questionnaire. In addition, Ireland responded they did not 
have capacity to answer the questionnaire, but they provided annual reports. These, however, were not used 
in this report, given it was not clear whether the information included matches the questions in the survey. Bel-
gium responded without answering the questionnaire. 
7
21
Responded
Did not
respond
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4. Survey analysis 
Structure of this section/Reading guidance 
For each of the nine topics covered by our survey, this section provides the con-
text which has led us to choose the specific questions, the results we received, 
and their analysis. The data source of the figures presented is always our survey 
and follow-up emails, unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
For each of the following sub-chapters (corresponding to each of the topics cov-
ered), we apply the following structure: First comes a description of the context 
of the topic and the theoretical and practical reasons why the specific questions 
were asked. Afterwards, the responses received will be presented and described. 
Potential caveats of the relevant questions and the responses received will be 
mentioned. 
Finally, hypotheses about the meaning of the results in light of the theoretical 
reasons will be generated. It should be kept in mind that due to a limited number 
of respondents the results might not be representative of tax administrations in 
general. 
Some responding jurisdictions did not provide answers to several questions, 
most of which either because questions were not applicable to the jurisdiction or 
because data was not available; in some cases, the reasons remain unknown. 
In the following parts we employ the following codes to distinguish the types of 
non-responses:  
NA = The jurisdiction reported that the data on this question was not available. 
N/A = The jurisdiction reported that the question was not applicable, or this 
could be deducted from responses given to other questions. 
NR = The jurisdiction left the field bank without further explanation. 
As part of our analysis of the data we received (and as can be seen in the follow-
ing graphs), we treated “not-applicable”, “not available” as a non-response, so 
that it is possible to see the availability of data from tables such as table 1. 
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Table 1: Responses received to specific questions, not available or not applicable=“No“ 
 CYP FIN LTU LVA POL PRT SVK 
Number of desk audits Partial Partial Yes Partial Yes Yes No 
Audits of tax returns No Yes Yes Partial Yes No Partial 
On-site audits Partial No Yes Partial Partial Partial Partial 
Administrative penalties imposed No Partial Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Administrative penalties collected No Partial Yes No No Yes No 
Prosecutions No No No Partial Partial Yes No 
Whistleblower protection Yes Yes No Yes Yes Partial No 
Large taxpayer office Partial Yes Partial Yes No Partial Partial 
High net worth individual unit No Partial No No No Partial No 
Staff mobility Partial Partial Partial Partial Partial Partial No 
Automatic exchange of informa-
tion Partial Partial Yes Partial Yes Partial Partial 
Country by country reporting Yes Partial Partial Yes Yes Yes Partial 
 
4.1 Audit activity 
4.1.1 Context 
Verifying information and claims returned by the taxpayer to the tax administra-
tion ranks among the main tasks of every tax administration and constitutes the 
first step in enforcing tax policy and ensuring that a taxpayer is charged the cor-
rect amount of taxes. Audit activity can be carried out in different ways: control-
ling the consistency of information provided in a tax return, conducting enquiries 
when irregularities are detected or visiting the taxpayer’s premises to verify 
claims or seize documents. In our survey, we concentrated on desk audits, which 
is the most common form of audit activity, as well as on the number of tax re-
turns that are audited by a tax administration. A desk audit is an “intervention 
usually resulting from an in-office review of information returned by the taxpayer 
and normally takes the form of further written or telephonic enquiries.” 30.  
If only a low number of tax returns is actually audited, it could mean that tax-
payers would calculate that the probability of detection of false statements is 
very low and thus a number of taxpayers would probably underreport taxable in-
come. Auditing therefore does not only fulfil the function of correcting false 
statement by taxpayers, but also of preventing taxpayers from making false 
statements in the first place – if the latter know that they are likely to be de-
tected (deterrence effect). 
The OECD Tax Administration report provides a significant amount of data on au-
dit activity and delivers numbers of audits broken down by type of audit (desk 
audit, comprehensive audit, issue-oriented audit) and by type of tax (PIT, CIT, 
                                        
30 IMF and others, ‘International Survey on Revenue Administration (ISORA) - Questionnaire’, 2016, 43 
<http://data.rafit.org/?sk=3dba84d7-1dd8-4533-b682-c0dfcb1d7f13&sId=1445908451587> [accessed 16 July 
2018]. 
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VAT, tax withheld from employers). It does not ask, however, for the number of 
tax returns that are audited.  
However, these two kinds of breakdowns are not combined with each other. 
Therefore, it is impossible to know what kind of audits and how many are carried 
out for which types of tax.  
Finally, the decisive information about the intensity by which a tax administration 
undertakes audits is the number of audits where auditors actually visit the prem-
ises of the taxpayers to gather information. In that context it is important to con-
sider for which type of taxpayer and tax these intense audits are done. One 
would expect that large corporate income taxpayer are more intensively audited, 
as the risk of tax avoidance (in terms of value) is higher in this category and the 
potential additional amount that could be collected greater. A greater focus on 
smaller taxpayer could point problematic political influence of large taxpayers or 
deliberate considerations to leave these out of the compliance effort.  
Thereby it also matters how well these audit activities are staffed. A reduction in 
staff or in numbers of audits undertaken could signify that a tax administration 
reduces its efforts to identify tax fraud. 
The questionnaire therefore asked for the total number of desk audits under-
taken by the tax administration, as well as for the number of audits undertaken 
for each type of tax (PIT, CIT, VAT) for the years 2015 to 2017. It also asked for 
the total number of tax returns audited by the tax administration, as well as for 
the number of audits undertaken for each type of tax (PIT, CIT, VAT) for the 
years 2015 to 2017. It subsequently asked to indicate all numbers as a percent-
age of all tax returns received. Finally, concerning on-site audits, it asked for the 
number of on-site audits carried out, the staffing as well as for the additional 
amounts collected during those audits. These data points were requested for 
each year from 2015 to 2017 as well as for each category of taxes (PIT, CIT, VAT 
including a special question on large CIT taxpayers).  
 
4.1.2 Results 
A total of 6 jurisdictions provided an answer on desk audits, and 5 on audits of 
tax returns: 
Table 2: Responses received - desk audits 
 CYP FIN LTU LVA POL PRT SVK 
Number of desk audits Partial Partial Yes Partial Yes Yes No31 
Audits of tax returns No Yes Yes Partial Yes No Partial 
On-site audits Partial No Yes Partial Partial Partial Partial 
                                        
31 Slovakia responded that the questions are not applicable, since in “accordance with the Tax Code, Slovak Fi-
nancial administration does not perform desk audits.” 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3300589 
   
 
23 
 
 
4.1.2.1 Desk audits 
                                        
32 Lithuania noted that the numbers show how many tax investigations have been conducted and how many 
taxpayers were contacted (by phone, e-mail, other means) regarding incorrect tax returns. In the ISORA ques-
tionnaire, Lithuania reported a significantly inferior total number of desk audits carried out, as since then Lithu-
ania has revised its internal definition of what it considers as desk audits. Further, Lithuania noted that a “tax 
investigation could cover the examination of tax returns and payment of few taxes (e.g. VAT and CIT). In these 
cases, such tax investigation is assigned to both categories: “Number of Desk Audits regarding Corporate In-
come tax (CIT)” and “Number of Desk Audits regarding Value Added Tax (VAT)”. 
 
Figure 2: Number of desk audits - Cyprus 
 
Figure 3: Number of desk audits - Finland 
 
 
Note: Data for 2017 was not ready yet. 
 
Figure 4: Number of desk audits - Lithuania 
 
 
Note: See footnote.32  
 
Figure 5: Number of desk audits Latvia 
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The figures above show that between 2015 and 2017, the numbers of desk au-
dits decreased in Cyprus, Finland, Lithuania and Portugal. Poland carried out less 
desk audits regarding PIT and CIT in 2017 than in 2015, but nevertheless rec-
orded a higher total number of desk audits because of significantly more audits 
done on VAT. Portugal and Latvia only provided data on the total number in 
2015, so no comparison over time was possible. 
The data is presented separately for each country, since the figures are on en-
tirely different scales; for example, while each year more than 2 Million desk au-
dits are conducted in Poland, there are only about 12,000 in Latvia.  
To compare countries with each other as well as to compare the relative im-
portance of the types of taxes, the data on audit activity needs to be put in rela-
tion with the numbers of taxpayers in each country for each type of tax, which is 
the purpose of the next graph. 
                                        
33 In Poland the total number is significantly greater than the sum of PIT+CIT+VAT, which probably means that 
the total includes the number of desk audits carried out with regards to other taxes. 
Figure 6: Number of desk audits - Poland33 
 
 
Figure 7: Number of desk audits - Portugal 
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Figure 8: Desk audits per 100 taxpayers - comparing countries and tax types 
 
Note: The number of active taxpayers is taken from the OECD Tax Administration 2017 report 34. 
The data IDs 82750, 82760, 82770 and 82780 for year 2015. Only the data for the year 2015 was 
available regarding the number of active taxpayers. Since the total number of desk audits might 
also include other types of taxes, the total number of taxpayers was calculated as the sum of PIT, 
VAT, CIT taxpayers and of employers paying withholding tax35. The numbers of desk audits are 
taken from the responses to our survey, as presented in Figures 2-7 above. For better readability, 
the number of desk audits was multiplied by 100.  
Finland and Poland put a rather high emphasis on desk audits of CIT taxpayers, 
while Lithuania rather focuses on PIT and VAT. In Poland, the focus on VAT tax 
returns is the greatest. Given the data on taxpayers is only available from ISORA 
for the year 2015, it is not possible to make the comparison over time. This is 
only possible to some extent within countries, as done above (although some 
fluctuations in the number of taxpayers over the years are also likely to take 
place).  
4.1.2.2 Audits of tax returns 
 
                                        
34 OECD, Tax Administration 2017 Annex A: Data Tables, Tax Administration (2017), 158–63 <https://www.oecd-ili-
brary.org/taxation/tax-administration-2017/data-tables_tax_admin-2017-21-en> [accessed 5 October 2017]. 
35 Representing the total number of taxpayers as sum of the 4 numbers of taxpayers for each of these 4 types 
of taxes might be problematic, as there might be other types of taxes or one taxpayer might be registered for 
several types. However, it is the best approach available from the data we dispose of. 
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Figure 9: Number of audits of tax returns - Finland 
 
 
Figure 10: Number of audits of tax returns - Lithuania 
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Figure 11: Number of audits of tax returns - Latvia 
 
Note: Latvia noted that tax audit of the Latvian tax administration is carried out for a specific tax 
period and type of taxes, not for declarations. Therefore, it is not possible to specify the number of 
audits as a percentage of tax returns. No data on PIT and no total number was provided. 
Figure 12: Number of audits of tax returns - Poland 
 
Note: Poland noted that the data on number of audits in PIT, CIT and VAT relate to the audits dur-
ing which irregularities were detected. The VAT audits usually embrace at least a period of a year 
and according to the Polish tax law in general taxpayers are obliged to submit VAT returns 
monthly. 
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Figure 13: Number of audits of tax returns - Slovakia 
 
Note: Slovakia noted that the numbers of PIT include only income tax of business (entrepreneurs 
and legal persons). For the year 2017, only data on VAT was available.  
In all 5 countries, the number of audits seems to decrease, both in absolute 
numbers and as a percentage of all submitted tax returns. Moreover, this pattern 
can be observed for all three types of taxes, with a different magnitude however. 
In Finland, the overall reduction of audits is mostly due to a reduction of the au-
dit of CIT tax returns. In Lithuania, audits of VAT tax returns have been reduced 
the most. It should be noted that different scales were used to present data for 
each country. Lithuania is an outlier compared to the other countries, with up to 
26% of tax returns audited compared to only around 1% for all other countries. 
The footnote concerning Poland is important in this regard, however, as it indi-
cates that the number provided does not relate to all returns that have under-
gone checks, but only to those that have been examined more closely after the 
preliminary checks have revealed irregularities. Such understanding may explain 
the rather low percentages of tax returns audited. 
The absolute numbers of returns audited also vary a lot between countries, but 
this can be explained by the different numbers of total tax returns submitted. 
The following graph compares the average percentages of tax returns audited 
between countries and types of tax: 
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Figure 14: Number of audits of tax returns as a percentage of total tax returns submitted - com-
paring countries and taxes 
 
Note: The numbers are averages of the years 2015-2017. Latvia provided data on absolute num-
bers of tax returns audited, but not as a percentage of total tax returns submitted. 
The stark discrepancy between the number reported by the Lithuanian tax au-
thority might point to a completely different audit practice or to a different un-
derstanding of the concept “audit of tax return”. It is also noteworthy that except 
from Lithuania, all jurisdictions have reported a lower number of audits of tax re-
turns than desk audits.  
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Figure 15: Number of on-site audits by category of taxpayer 
 
Figure 15 shows that the number of on-site audits that have been carried out 
have been reduced between 2015 and 2017 by all three jurisdictions. In Slo-
vakia, by far the most on-site audits are carried out with regards to VAT, fol-
lowed by PIT and lastly CIT. In Latvia and Lithuania, most of on-site audits are 
also carried out on VAT, but the difference is less striking with compared to CIT 
and PIT. However, to compare countries and types of taxes, these numbers need 
to be seen in relation to the numbers of taxpayers concerned: 
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Figure 16: Percentage of taxpayers having undergone an on-site audit by category of taxpayer 
 
Note: The number of active taxpayers is taken from the OECD Tax Administration 2017 report 36. 
The data IDs 82750, 82760, 82770 for year 2015. The number of large taxpayers is the number of 
taxpayers that are managed by the large taxpayer office. It should be noted that there is a small 
chance that tax administrations might have used another definition of “large” regarding the data of 
on-site audits than for the number of taxpayers managed by the large taxpayer office. Latvia noted 
that regarding on-site audits, a large taxpayer was defined as having a turnover greater than 4M 
EUR. Further, only the data for the year 2015 was available regarding the number of active taxpay-
ers. Nevertheless, in order to be able to compare countries, the average of administrative penalties 
of the years 2015-2017 was used here, in order to smooth out fluctuations. The numbers are taken 
from the responses to our survey, as presented in Figure 15 above. For better readability, the 
number of penalties was multiplied by 100. Thus, the value can be represented like this: 
𝐴𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 (2015−2017) 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑×100
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠 2015
. 
As expected, in Latvia and Lithuania, the percentage of large taxpayers that re-
ceive on-site audits with regards to CIT is significantly greater than the share of 
other types of taxpayers that are audited. It is all the more astonishing that the 
general percentage of VAT taxpayers that receive an on-site audit is higher in 
Slovakia than the share of large taxpayers whose corporate income tax declara-
tions are audited through an on-site visit. This shows that the Slovakian tax ad-
ministration puts definitely a higher emphasis on enforcing compliance with re-
gards to VAT than CIT. 
In general, it is remarkable that only 2.4%, 6.4% and 14.3% of large taxpayers 
are audited with regards to corporate income tax respectively, despite the fact 
                                        
36 OECD, Tax Administration 2017 Annex A: Data Tables, 141; 158–63. 
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that the average yield of an on-site audit is significantly higher with regards to 
corporate income tax by a large taxpayer than from the average taxpayer (visi-
ble in Slovakia).  
 
Figure 17: Average audit yield of on-site audits in Slovakia 
 
Figures 18, 19 and 20 finally show that in Portugal, the additional amount of au-
dits collected increased significantly between 2015 and 2017, whereas in Slo-
vakia the amount increased from 2015 to 2016 and decreased again in 2017. In 
Lithuania the amount decreased. Regarding large taxpayers there was a steady 
decrease in the amount collected in Slovakia and an increase in Lithuania and 
Portugal. 
 Figure 18: Audit yield of on-site audits Lithua-
nia 
 
Figure 19: Audit yield of on-site audits Slovakia 
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Lithuania and Latvia provided numbers on the staff conducting on-site audits dif-
ferentiated by type of tax. However, (at least in Latvia) auditors are in fact not 
organisationally divided according to tax types, as one auditor performs for ex-
ample both VAT and corporate income tax audits. Therefore, a comparison of the 
staffing level of different types of taxes is not possible. The total number of staff 
carrying out on-site audits decreased in Lithuania from 349 in 2015 to 220 in 
2017 and from 237 to 220 in Latvia. However, as the total number of on-site au-
dits carried out decreased more, the staffing level per audit (or the number of 
on-site audits per FTE) increased as depicted in Figure 21. Portugal provided 
data on the staffing of on-site audits for large CIT taxpayers only, which in-
creased from 59 FTE in 2015 to 82 FTE in 2017. 
 
4.1.3 Summary/Hypotheses 
There are important differences between countries regarding the number of desk 
audits carried out, which should be further explored, including whether these 
have any consequences on the overall performance of the tax administration.   
Concerning audits of tax returns, uncertainties remain with regards to the com-
parability of the results. Nevertheless, it can be retained that there is a common 
general trend of a decrease in the percentage of tax returns that are audited by 
tax administrations, and the decrease occurs across all types of taxes. It is also 
remarkable that in three of the four country that reported data on that matter, 
less than 1% of tax returns are generally audited. In subsequent surveys it 
might be necessary to describe the meaning of the term “audit of tax return” 
more in detail or to conduct qualitative studies into the differences of auditing 
practice and if they can indeed be translated into differences in capacity. It might 
be necessary that with on-going digitisation, tax administrations might cease to 
Figure 20: Audit yield of on-site audits in Portu-
gal 
 
Figure 21: Number of on-site audits per FTE in 
Lithuania and Latvia 
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ask for tax returns and rather continually gather data with the help of third par-
ties, so that the term “audit of tax return” might not be appropriate anymore to 
gather insightful data about the audit activities of tax administrations. 
Finally, regarding on-site audits, the comparison of different countries is difficult 
due to limitations in the data. Nevertheless, it can be noted that the numbers of 
on-site audits carried out decrease in three countries, whereas in one country 
one can suppose that it increases (as the yield collected increases). The percent-
age of on-site that are carried out regarding the corporate income tax of large 
taxpayers is rather low in all three countries that provided responses if one con-
siders the importance of large taxpayers for revenue generation and the reduc-
tion of inequality. The marked differences of jurisdiction’s audit intensity across 
different types of taxes points to the importance of collecting this data in the 
future, as these differences might be explained by political interferences 
stemming from government preferences around inequality or cronyism. 
Future research on audit activity should be carried out and strategies to refine 
questions should be developed. It seems all the more important as a recent in-
vestigation by the German federal audit institution revealed that statistics re-
ported by the tax administration were erroneous (due to an incentive of auditors 
to overreport the number and yield of audits)37. 
 
4.2 Administrative penalties 
4.2.1 Context 
Administrative penalties are civil (usually monetary) penalties imposed on tax-
payers for violating laws or regulations. Such penalties are imposed, for exam-
ple, when taxpayers are late with the submission of their returns or with paying 
the taxes due, among others, following an audit of the tax administration which 
resulted in a higher tax payment than that assessed by the taxpayer.  
While penalties are not the only means to secure compliance, they can deter the 
taxpayers from not paying their taxes due: The amount payable will be higher in 
the end for a taxpayer who chooses not to comply in the first place. However, 
such threat would not be effective if taxpayers know that penalties are only very 
rarely imposed and/or that the tax administration undertakes no great efforts in 
collecting them.  
Imposing a low number or a low value of administrative penalties could mean 
that the tax administration is lacking capacity to detect irregularities on tax pay-
                                        
37 Spiegel Online, ‘Finanzministerien Schummeln Bei Betriebsprüfungen’, 18 August 2018 <http://www.spie-
gel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/bundesfinanzministerium-mit-rechenfehlern-bei-betriebspruefungen-a-
1223681.html> [accessed 20 August 2018]. 
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ments or is too lenient. If only a low share of the penalties imposed are effec-
tively collected this could indicate that the administration lacks capacity or will to 
properly enforce tax policy. 
The OECD also notes that perceived fairness is a potential driver of voluntary tax 
compliance. One of the relevant dimensions of fairness is “retributive fairness”, 
which means that tax authority is “fair in the application of punishment when the 
rules are broken” 38. With other words, if individuals or entities breaking the rules 
only face low penalties or if these penalties are actually not collected, this could 
have a negative impact on taxpayers’ willingness to comply voluntarily. 
It is also important to assess the differences in the imposition of penalties differ-
entiated by types of taxes, in order to know whether some types of taxes only 
receive relatively few or no penalties. 
The survey first asked for the numbers and for the value of administrative penal-
ties collected in the years 2015 to 2017 (in total, and for PIT, CIT and VAT). It 
further asked what percentage of the number of administrative penalties has 
been collected so far. 
4.2.2 Results 
The table below shows that 5 countries provided data on the penalties imposed, 
but only three on the penalties collected. 
Table 3: Responses received - administrative penalties 
 CYP FIN LTU LVA POL PRT SVK 
Administrative penalties 
imposed No Partial Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Administrative penalties 
collected No Partial Yes No No Yes No 
 
4.3.2.a Number of administrative penalties imposed per country (total 
and for each type of tax) 
 
                                        
38 OECD, Understanding and Influencing Taxpayers’ Compliance Behaviour, 2010 <http://www.oecd.org/tax/fo-
rum-on-tax-administration/publications-and-products/compliance/46274793.pdf> [accessed 6 August 2018]. 
Figure 22: Number of administrative penalties: 
Finland 
Figure 23: Number of administrative penalties: 
Lithuania 
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39 The total number of penalties is always lower than the sum of PIT+CIT+VAT in Latvia, which might indicate 
that penalties are sometimes imposed with regards to several types of taxes at once. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Number of administrative penalties: 
Latvia39 
 
 
Figure 25: Number of administrative penalties: 
Portugal 
 
 
Figure 26: Number of administrative penalties: Slovakia 
 
 
Note: In Slovakia, the administrative penalties regarding PIT only relate to income tax of busi-
nesses (entrepreneurs and legal persons).  
 
 
62
4,
47
5
60
7,
83
9
N
A16
,0
04
13
,8
17
N
A15
,9
84
15
,7
73
N
A
44
0,
59
2
42
9,
21
5
33
5,
01
9
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
700,000
2015 2016 2017
FIN
Total PIT CIT VAT
1,
76
2
1,
60
9
1,
18
9
58
2
53
6
3
9
458
9
53
6
40
159
1
53
7
3
9
4
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2015 2016 2017
LTU
Total PIT CIT VAT
1,163 1,087
817
30
4
27
1
19
64
09
35
3
18
2
915 895
687
0
500
1,000
1,500
2015 2016 2017
LVA
Total PIT CIT VAT
58
2,
30
2
87
3
,7
03
53
4,
12
0
24
5
,9
13
29
0,
70
3
18
5,
4
85
19
,2
29 2
65
,2
70
97
,8
78
24
6,
92
7
21
7
,8
63
17
3,
2
04
0
200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
2015 2016 2017
PRT
Total PIT CIT VAT
67
,4
76
1
1
0
,6
6
3
10
8,
95
8
9,
71
6
12
,4
29
12
,3
45
10
,8
85 30
,6
97
30
,8
91
30
,2
90
44
,7
54
42
,5
89
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
2015 2016 2017
SVK
Total PIT CIT VAT
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3300589 
   
 
37 
 
The figures above report for each country how the imposition of administrative 
penalties evolved over the years and for which kind of taxes most penalties were 
imposed. It is important to note in the graphs above that the scales are very dif-
ferent: While the total number of penalties imposed was more than 600,000 in 
Finland, it was only about 1,200 in Latvia. Due to these great differences in 
scale, it was not possible to present all countries together in one graph. 
The total number of administrative penalties imposed decreased in Lithuania and 
Latvia between 2015 and 2017. In Slovakia, the total number increased between 
2015 and 2016 and remained stable in 2017. In Portugal, the number increased 
from 2015 to 2016 (especially due to an increase in penalties imposed with re-
gards to CIT), but decreased again from 2016 to 2017. For Finland, no total 
number of penalties imposed was available for 2017, nor were the data for CIT 
and PIT for that year. However, from the numbers available for penalties im-
posed with regards to VAT, and the trends that can be seen for CIT and PIT in 
2015-2016, it is likely to assume that the total number also decreased between 
2016 and 2017. In all four countries, most administrative penalties are imposed 
with regards to VAT.  
However, these differences probably arise in part due to a difference in the num-
ber of active taxpayers that are managed by the jurisdiction’s tax administration. 
The following graph therefore displays the number of penalties that are imposed 
by each country for each type of tax in relation to the number of active taxpayers 
registered for each type of tax. 
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Figure 27: Number of administrative penalties imposed per 100 active taxpayers 
 
Note: The number of active taxpayers is taken from the OECD Tax Administration 2017 report 40. 
The data IDs 82750, 82760, 82770 for year 2015. Only the data for the year 2015 was available 
regarding the number of active taxpayers. Nevertheless, in order to be able to compare countries, 
the average of administrative penalties of the years 2015-2017 was used here, in order to smooth 
out fluctuations. The numbers are taken from the responses to our survey, as presented in Figures 
22-26 above. For better readability, the number of penalties was multiplied by 100. Thus, the value 
can be represented like this: 
𝐴𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 (2015−2017) 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑×100
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠 2015
. 
Figure 27 still shows large differences in the frequency of imposition of penalties. 
While Finland imposed penalties on almost two thirds of all VAT taxpayers Lithua-
nia and Latvia generally imposed penalties on less than 1 in 100 taxpayers. In 
Finland, it is interesting to see, that there is a great difference in the number of 
penalties imposed on VAT and PIT taxpayers. With the exception of Portugal, all 
countries impose the highest number of penalties with regards to VAT, in relation 
to the number of taxpayers. 
4.3.2.b The value of administrative penalties imposed 
Alongside the number of penalties imposed, the value of administrative penalties 
also matters to have an indication of the tax authorities’ enforcement powers 
(e.g. if there is an indication that the value of penalties is very low, then it may 
indicate that their deterrence effect on tax payers is rather low). 
                                        
40 OECD, Tax Administration 2017 Annex A: Data Tables, 158–63. 
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Figure 28: Value of administrative penalties imposed 
 
Note: In Slovakia, the value of administrative penalties relating to PIT only includes tax on income 
from business (entrepreneurs and legal persons). 
In all countries, the total value of penalties imposed increased between 2015 and 
2016 but decreased again in 2017. In Slovakia the rise is particularly important. 
In terms of tax types, the value imposed is highest with regards to VAT for all ju-
risdictions (one exception is the year 2016 in Portugal, where most penalties 
were imposed with regards to CIT). 
However, to be able to compare countries and tax types with each other, it is 
necessary to compare the imposition of penalties with the tax revenues raised in 
each country and for each type of tax, as done in the following graph:  
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Figure 29: Value of administrative penalties imposed as percentage of tax revenue collected – com-
paring countries and taxes 
 
Note: Data on tax revenue collected was taken from 41, variables individual taxation, corporate 
taxation and indirect taxation for the year 2015 (general government); Data is only available for 
the year 2015, but to smooth out fluctuations it was compared with the arithmetic mean (average) 
values of administrative penalties collected for the years 2015 to 2017. 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 (2015 − 2017) 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝐼𝑇; 𝐶𝐼𝑇; 𝑉𝐴𝑇
𝑃𝐼𝑇, 𝐶𝐼𝑇, 𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 2015
 
This figure displays a different image than figure 27 which compared the number 
of administrative penalties imposed. While in comparison to the other countries, 
Finland imposed a high number of penalties, these are of rather low value com-
pared to tax revenue collected. Latvia on the other hand imposes a rather low 
number but the penalties imposed have a high value.  
In terms of the focus, this figure gives a different image than the previous one as 
well. In all countries except Slovakia the imposed value of penalties compared to 
the importance of the tax type in the tax mix is highest with regards to CIT. 
Compared to its relative importance in the tax mix, the lowest value of penalties 
is imposed with regards to PIT everywhere.  
The following graph explains why the rankings of countries are so different if the 
number or the value of penalties imposed is compared:  
                                        
41 ICTD/UNU-WIDER, ‘Government Revenue Dataset, Version November 2017’, 2017 <https://www.wider.unu.edu/pro-
ject/government-revenue-dataset> [accessed 9 July 2018]. 
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Figure 30: Average values of administrative penalties imposed (2015-2017) 
 
Note: Calculation based on the sum of the value of penalties imposed for the years 2015-2017 di-
vided by the sum of the number of penalties imposed for the years 2015-2017, for each country 
and each type of tax. 
Administrative penalties imposed are on average of much greater value in Latvia 
(between about 18,000 EUR to about 79,000 EUR depending on the type of tax) 
than in all other countries. In Portugal and Finland, penalties are worth only sev-
eral hundred euros on average. This could point to a totally different practice of 
imposing penalties in Latvia than in other countries.  
4.3.2.c Percentage of administrative penalties collected so far 
Equally interesting to the number and value of administrative penalties imposed 
is the number of these penalties actually collected so far: 
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Figure 31: Percentage of number of administrative penalties collected so far 
 
Note: For Finland, data on collection of penalties concerning PIT and on total collection were not 
available; and for the year 2017, no data was available. 
The data provided by the three countries indicates that only a rather low share of 
administrative penalties is effectively collected (nowhere more than 40%, in Lith-
uania not more than 6% in total). There seems to be a decreasing trend, but this 
could be explained by the fact that it might take more than a year to collect pen-
alties and thus fewer recently imposed penalties have been collected than older 
ones. 
There are no clear patterns detectable as for which type of tax data is more eas-
ily collected, except that in Finland and Portugal it seems to be more difficult to 
collect penalties imposed with regards to VAT than concerning other taxes.   
4.2.3 Summary/Hypotheses 
The analysis shows that no clear time trend is detectable regarding the number 
of administrative penalties imposed, but that there are important differences be-
tween countries. There are equally important differences between countries re-
garding the value of penalties, but the “ranking” of countries is different here, as 
the average value of penalties varies a lot between countries. 
However, as stated above this evidence is not in itself conclusive without further 
comparison with other data, as a low number or a low value of administrative 
penalties may also mean that taxpayers are more compliant or that it is gener-
ally easier to comply with tax laws.  
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Regarding the value of penalties imposed, the trend is not clear. As shown 
above, in 2016 higher penalties were imposed than in 2015, but this trend did 
not continue in 2017. 
The percentage of administrative penalties that is actually collected is providing a 
more conclusive finding, as it shows how capable the tax administration is to en-
force its own regulations. Neither of the three countries that reported data suc-
ceeded in collecting more than 50 per cent of the penalties that were charged in 
any of the years. This low percentage of collected penalties raises important 
questions and points to an important data gap in existing official data. The fact 
that the other respondents did not or could not report data on this topic might 
also point to a lack of a proper enforcement management system. 
 
4.3 Prosecutions 
4.3.1 Context 
A tax administration might refer cases for criminal prosecution if it concludes af-
ter an audit that the taxpayer has illegally reduced the payable tax, i.e. evaded 
tax on purpose, e.g. by not reporting parts of income s/he received. Other cases 
might include criminal attacks on the tax system, such as for example the “Miss-
ing Trader Fraud” or the “VAT carousel”, where traders claim refunds of VAT pay-
ments that have actually never taken place 42. 
Pursuing such cases is necessary to adequately punish behaviour that is detri-
mental to society and to deter taxpayers from committing such offences. With 
regards to inequality, criminal prosecutions are likely to have a higher deterrent 
effect than administrative penalties, as tax dodgers cannot simply weigh civil 
penalties against ‘tax savings’, but may confront prison terms.^  
As with administrative penalties, it is important to differentiate for which types of 
taxes prosecutions are initiated, so that it is possible to know whether any type 
is left out from prosecution activity. 
Further, it is important to consider that a low percentage of finalized cases might 
point to a lack of means to collect the evidence necessary to successfully pursue 
cases or alternatively to a lack of willingness to enforce compliance.  
The questionnaire therefore asked for the number of tax investigations that were 
referred for criminal investigations (total and concerning PIT, CIT and VAT sepa-
rately) and how many of these cases have been finalized through criminal prose-
cution.  
                                        
42 Reuters, ‘FACTBOX - How Carousel Fraud Works’, 2009 <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-carousel-fraud-
britain-factbox-sb-idUKTRE57J43U20090820> [accessed 19 July 2018]. 
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4.3.2 Results 
Only three countries reported data on criminal prosecutions: Poland, Latvia and 
Portugal.  
Table 4: Responses received - Prosecutions 
 CYP FIN LTU LVA POL PRT SVK 
Prosecutions No No No Partial Partial Yes No 
 
Figure 32: Number of tax investigations re-
ferred for criminal prosecution and finalised 
cases: Poland 
 
 
Figure 33: Number of tax investigations referred 
for criminal prosecution and finalised cases: Lat-
via 
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Figure 34: Number of tax investigations referred for criminal prosecution and no. of finalised cases 
by tax type: Portugal 
 
Note: In Portugal, a criminal investigation process may contain offences of several tax codes (PIT, 
CIT and VAT). Thus, the numbers presented with regards to PIT, can also be accounted simultane-
ously in the category CIT or VAT, according to the taxes considered in the process. 
The three figures above show that in Poland and Portugal, the number of investi-
gations referred for criminal prosecutions decreased from 2015 to 2017, while in 
Latvia the number increased. 
Portugal also reported data that is differentiated by type of tax: It is interesting 
that by far the highest share of all criminal prosecutions are related to VAT ra-
ther than to CIT or PIT. However, for all types of tax, only less than 30% of in-
vestigations referred for criminal prosecutions have been finalized so far.  
Similar to the case of administrative penalties, there are important differences 
between countries regarding the number of cases referred for criminal prosecu-
tion. The following graph therefore compares the practice of referring cases for 
criminal prosecution between countries by assessing how many cases were re-
ferred per 100 taxpayers.  
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Figure 35: Average no. of cases referred for criminal prosecution and average number of finalised 
cases (2015-2017) per 100 active taxpayers (2015) - comparing countries 
 
 Note: Number of active taxpayers is taken from the OECD Tax Administration 2017 report 43. The 
data IDs 82750, 82760, 82770, 82780 for year 2015. The total number is calculated as the sum of 
the number of active VAT, PIT, CIT and withholding taxpayers44. Number of cases referred is the 
average of the years 2015-2017, as shown in figures above.  
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 (2015 − 2017) 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠 (𝑃𝐼𝑇 + 𝐶𝐼𝑇 + 𝑉𝐴𝑇 + 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑎𝑥) 𝑖𝑛 2015
 
For Latvia and Portugal this echoes the findings of the above chapter on adminis-
trative penalties, where Latvia imposed relatively few penalties and Portugal 
comparatively more (on Poland, there was no data on penalties available). 
4.3.3 Summary/Hypotheses 
There are important differences between countries regarding the practice of 
criminal prosecution. One country shows that most criminal prosecutions involve 
the Value Added Tax. 
From the cases initiated during the last three years, only few have been finalised 
so far. This, however, could also have multiple reasons, related to administrative 
capacity or not. It could, for example, be due to a lack of powers to gather nec-
essary evidence, but also to a lack of capacity of the court system. It would be 
                                        
43 OECD, Tax Administration 2017 Annex A: Data Tables, 158–63. 
44 Representing the total number of taxpayers as sum of the 4 numbers of taxpayers for each of these 4 types 
of taxes might be problematic, as there might be other types of taxes or one taxpayer might be registered for 
several types. However, it is the best approach available from the data we dispose of. 
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interesting in subsequent research to further investigate, why so few cases are 
finalised, how many prosecutions are in the end successful and what the reasons 
for failure are.  There is also a need gather more precise data on the cases in-
volved in order to make a more precise argument on the role of criminal prose-
cutions for inequality: On what kind of tax has the fraud been committed? Who 
are the taxpayers involved? What monetary value do the cases have? 
 
 
4.4 Whistleblower protection and reward 
4.4.1 Context 
A culture of integrity within the tax administration is necessary so that it cor-
rectly fulfils its mission. To maintain such a culture, organisational safeguards 
can help shielding the tax administration from non-compliance or corrupt prac-
tices, especially in higher management. One such safeguard is the protection of 
whistleblowers, who publicly denounce unlawful practices that take place in an 
organization, often on the public’s account. Without the assistance of whistle-
blowers, illegal practices in organizations may remain unknown/silent and cause 
damage to the society. An example of a disclosure of concerning practices in a 
tax administration is the case of Antoine Deltour who used to work for PriceWa-
terhouseCoopers (PWC) and revealed tax rulings concluded between multina-
tional companies (MNCs) and the Luxembourgish tax authority. These tax rulings 
enabled MNCs to avoid huge sums of taxes due in other countries across the 
world. The disclosure of the information by Deltour (also known as LuxLeaks45) 
has led to widespread criticism on these rulings and had political consequences: 
The European Commission used the data to investigate whether the ruling con-
stituted illegal state aid granted by Luxembourg, forcing Luxembourg in some 
cases to recover taxes due from multinationals such as Engie, Amazon, Fiat and 
McDonald’s 46. Pressured by the European Parliament, the European Commission 
subsequently proposed the automatic exchange of tax rulings between tax au-
thorities adopted in 2015 47.  
                                        
45 See https://www.icij.org/investigations/luxembourg-leaks/ 
46 Julie Martin, ‘More Tax Rulings under EU Scrutiny for Illegal State Aid, Vestager Says’, MNE Tax, 2016 
<https://mnetax.com/tranfer-pricing-state-aid-vestager-rulings-14421> [accessed 23 July 2018]; European 
Commission, ‘State Aid - Tax Rulings’, 2018 <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/tax_rulings/in-
dex_en.html> [accessed 8 August 2018]. 
47 European Parliament, ‘MEPs Call for Tax Harmonisation and Transparency on National Tax Rulings in “Lux 
Leaks” Debate’, 2014 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/priori-
ties/taxes/20141112IPR78502/meps-call-for-tax-harmonisation-and-transparency-in-lux-leaks-debate> [ac-
cessed 23 July 2018]. 
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Laws that impose criminal sanctions on whistleblowers intimidate and silence 
those who identify dubious or illegal activities by employees or other taxpayers. 
While it is important that regulations preventing the disclosure of confidential in-
formation exist, it is equally necessary to ensure effective legal protection for 
whistleblowers who reveal information of public concern ensuring the integrity of 
administrations or companies on behalf of the jurisdictions’ citizens and for the 
organizations’ own sake.  
A report by Transparency International from 2013 focused on whistleblower pro-
tection laws in 27 EU member states and found that only four countries had legal 
provisions that could be called advanced 48. Another report on G20 countries 
published in 2014, analysed the state of whistleblower protection rules in each of 
the G20 countries in both the public and private sectors. The report found im-
portant shortcomings which referred to several issues including the existence of 
anonymous channels for employees to discreetly report sensitive information, in-
dependent agencies to investigate whistleblowers’ disclosures and complaints, 
and transparent and accountable enforcement of whistleblower laws 49.  
In its tax policy report 2017, the European Commission joined these voices and 
recommended the establishment of regulations protecting whistleblowers in order 
to improve compliance within tax administrations 50. 
With regards to whistleblower protection, our survey included the following 4 
questions: 
1. Does the jurisdiction offer specific legal protection for whistleblowers? 
2. Were there any cases where serious violations of the law were revealed as 
a result of whistleblowers who were tax administration's staff?  
3. Are whistleblowers at the tax administration exposed to prison terms for 
breaching confidentiality laws or contracts?   
4. Were there any cases in the past where whistleblowers were sanctioned 
(e.g. fired or imprisoned) for divulging or publicly disclosing confidential 
information? 
 
4.4.2 Results 
 
                                        
48 Transparency International, Whistleblowing in Europe: Legal Protections for Whistleblowers in the EU, 2013, 
5 <http://files.transparency.org/content/download/697/2995/file/2013_WhistleblowingInEurope_EN.pdf>. 
49 Simon Wolfe and others, Whistleblower Protection Laws in G20 Countries, 2014, 1–2 <http://www.transpar-
ency.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/FINAL__-Whistleblower-Protection-Laws-in-G20-Countries-Priori-
ties-for__-Action.pdf> [accessed 9 July 2018]. 
50 European Commission, Tax Policies in the European Union. 2017 Survey, 89. 
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Table 5: Responses received - whistleblower protection and reward 
 CYP FIN LTU LVA POL PRT SVK 
Whistleblower protection Yes Yes No Yes Yes Partial No 
 
Note: The numbers are the number of countries. NR= jurisdiction did not respond; NA = country 
responded that data is not available; “Yes” is not a “full yes”, see explanation below 
3 jurisdictions (Cyprus, Finland and Latvia) responded “No” to all 4 questions 
meaning they don’t provide whistleblowers protection, and 2 jurisdictions (Lithu-
ania and Slovak Republic) did not respond. Portugal responded “No” to the first 
two questions, (i.e. they don’t provide whistleblowers protection and there were 
no cases of serious violation as a result of a disclosure by whistleblowers) and 
did not respond to the last two questions. Poland responded “yes” to the ques-
tion on whistleblower protection, however this is not a “full yes” as the response 
does not specifically relate to whistleblowers. This is the full note provided by the 
Polish tax authority: “There are not any specific regulations dedicated to the pro-
Figure 36: Specific legal protection for whistle-
blowers 
 
 
Figure 37: Cases of serious violation of the law 
revealed by whistleblowers 
 
 
Figure 38: Possibility of prison terms for whis-
tleblowers at the tax administrations 
 
 
Figure 39: Past cases of sanctions for whistle-
blowers 
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tection of whistleblowers. Under the Polish law employees are only generally pro-
tected against negative consequences related to the fact he or she revealed in-
formation concerning unlawful actions.” But Poland also responded with regards 
to the question on possible sanctions for whistleblowers that “the provisions of 
article 265 and 266 of the Polish Penal Code constitute a legal penal consequence 
for revealing confidential information.” This points to a possibility of conflicting 
legal provisions regarding whistleblowers. 
 
4.4.3 Summary/Hypotheses 
The evidence collected in this survey on tax administration echoes the findings of 
the above-mentioned reports on whistleblower laws in the EU. Of the countries 
surveyed, only one reported that some kind of legal protection existed, which at 
the same time might be weakened by another conflicting legal provision that 
threatens people with penalties for revealing confidential information. All other 
countries do not seem to have any protection for whistleblowers in place.     
The fact that no past cases of whistleblowers were reported in any jurisdiction 
might be due to a lack of protecting regulations. It could, however, just as well 
mean that there have not been any cases of unlawful actions within the tax ad-
ministrations – an interpretation which appears questionable considering the 
substantial number of cases identified for example in Germany 51.  
 
4.5 Staff mobility between public and private sector 
4.5.1 Context 
When regulators and regulated individuals or entities are too closely related to 
each other, and regulators are influenced to a high degree by the stakeholders 
they need to regulate, there is a risk of “regulatory capture”. Even if no outright 
corruption or direct lobby activities take place, a shared culture and adherence to 
the same ideology between tax administration staff and the companies they audit 
could already lead to ineffective regulation. One way such influence is exercised 
is through so-called “revolving doors”. The term refers to the practice that along 
their careers individuals move back and forth between public offices and roles in 
private firms or organizations in the same sector. The practice has taken place in 
many places around the world, including the EU Commission, where former com-
missioner Barroso joined the investment bank Goldman Sachs, and the US, 
where Federal Reserve and Treasury officials are frequently recruited from Wall 
                                        
51 Meinzer, Steueroase Deutschland. Warum Bei Uns Viele Reiche Keine Steuern Zahlen, 186–235. 
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Street 52. Among others, this practice has contributed to the financial crisis of 
2007/8, as due to personal proximity, financial institutes from Wall Street suc-
ceeded in convincing high officials of the Bush administration that they properly 
managed the risks inherent in the financial instruments that eventually led to the 
collapse of big banks 53. In the United States, which is considered as one of the 
top financial secrecy jurisdictions54, senior staff of the Congress committees re-
sponsible for drafting tax laws have formerly lobbied for favourable tax laws or 
special treatment on behalf of large corporate groups 55. 
In a recently published research by the Corporate Europe Observatory, it turned 
out that one third of the people who occupied top positions during the period 
2008-2017 in the Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services 
and Capital Markets Union at the European Commission either came from the fi-
nancial industry or moved to work there after working at the commission 56.  
If officials have the perspective of joining institutions they regulate after they 
quit their office or if due to a former long employment at a regulated entity they 
are still loyal to former colleagues, they might not have the incentive to properly 
enforce regulation. In tax administration, the risks are particularly pronounced in 
the divisions responsible for the audits of large companies because of the high 
sums involved in audit, the high salaries on offer by the private sector, and be-
cause often onsite auditors spend considerable time, sometimes even years, at 
the premises of the audited companies 57. At the same, these auditors have ac-
cess to privileged information and to tax audit tactics, which they can monetise 
in the audited firms after switching to the private sector. In Germany, for in-
stance, tax advisor Hanno Berger, against whom a criminal investigation is run-
ning due to his involvement in the so-called “cum-ex”-scandal58, used to work as 
auditor for the tax office of Frankfurt/Main before joining the private sector59  
                                        
52 Transparency International EU, Access All Areas. When EU Politicians Became Lobbyists, 2017 <transpar-
ency.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Access-all-areas.pdf> [accessed 12 July 2018]; Simon Johnson, ‘The 
Quiet Coup’, The Atlantic, 2009 <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/05/the-quiet-
coup/307364/> [accessed 11 July 2018]. 
53 Johnson, ‘The Quiet Coup’. 
54 See www.financialsecrecyindex.com; 16.8.2018. 
55 Lee Fang, ‘Former Tax Lobbyists Are Writing the Rules on Tax Dodging’, The Intercept, 2016 <https://theinter-
cept.com/2016/04/27/congress-tax-lobbyists/> [accessed 6 August 2018]. 
56 Corporate Europe Observatory, Financial Regulators and the Private Sector: Permanent Revolving Door at DG 
FISMA, 2018 <https://corporateeurope.org/power-lobbies-revolving-doors/2018/04/financial-regulators-and-
private-sector-permanent-revolving> [accessed 6 August 2018]. 
57 Meinzer, Steueroase Deutschland. Warum Bei Uns Viele Reiche Keine Steuern Zahlen, 235–62. 
58 “Cum-/Ex” refers to the practice of dividend stripping, see for example Paul Blickle and others, ‘The Multibil-
lion Euro Theft’, Zeit Online, 8 June 2017 <https://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2017-06/cum-ex-scandal-tax-eva-
sion-dividend-stripping-germany> [accessed 20 August 2018]. 
59 Meinzer, Steueroase Deutschland. Warum Bei Uns Viele Reiche Keine Steuern Zahlen. 
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To alleviate this type of detrimental effects of role-switching, many jurisdictions 
have put in place laws that prescribe so-called “cooling off”-periods, i.e. 
timespans during which public officials may not work with entities they previously 
regulated. However, these laws are not effective if they contain loopholes, 
breaches can only be penalized with weak sanctions or if these sanctions are in 
practice never applied.  
One of the factors that may also prevent a high frequency of “revolving doors” is 
a high share of employees with a permanent contract and high share of civil 
servants. Most countries have laws that can confer a special status, the status of 
civil servant, to employees of government. In general, civil servants enjoy a 
range of benefits, e.g. more job security than in the private sector, but also have 
a contractual duty to serve the public 60. 
To find out more about the effects of the revolving door phenomenon, our survey 
first asked for the total numbers of staff who left working for the private sector 
and to break down the numbers by civil servants who left. It further asked for le-
gal restrictions such as cooling-off periods for staff leaving to work for the private 
sector, for the sanctions that apply in case of violation of these restrictions as 
well as for past cases of violation. Similar questions were also asked with regards 
to specific units within the tax administration, namely the large taxpayer office 
and the High Net Worth Individuals unit. These will be presented in specific sub-
sequent chapters. 
 
4.5.2 Results 
 
Table 6: Responses received - staff mobility 
 CYP FIN LTU LVA POL PRT SVK 
Staff mobility Partial Partial Partial Partial Partial Partial No 
 
                                        
60 Staffan Synnerstrom and others, ‘Who and What Is a “Civil Servant”?’ <http://www1.worldbank.org/pub-
licsector/pe/PEAM_Who%20and%20What%20is%20a%20Civ%20Servant.doc> [accessed 13 August 2018]. 
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Figure 40: Number of staff left working in the private sector each year as percentage of total staff 
(FTE)  
 
Note: For total staff number, data was taken from 61. The data ID is 89380. Total staff number is 
only available for year 2015, so the increase or decrease in percentage might not be properly re-
flected. For Lithuania, the number represents the total number of staff that left the tax administra-
tion, either to the private sector, or to other sectors, as Lithuania specified they cannot provide 
only the number of staff who left only for the private sector) This could explain that the number is 
significantly higher than that of other countries.  
Data is not available for Cyprus, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia. 
 
Numbers in Finland and Portugal are very low and rather high in Lithuania, 
whereby the number in Lithuania also includes staff leaving to work in other sec-
tors. It is remarkable that Portugal reported zero staff leaving. This might be due 
to cultural factors that attach a high prestige to public service.  
The following table displays which legal restrictions on staff mobility between the 
public and the private sector are in place in the responding jurisdictions, as well 
as information on sanctions on the violation of these restrictions: 
Table 7: Restrictions on staff mobility between the public and private sector 
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civil serv-
ant staff 
re-
strictions 
CYP O O X N/A N/A 
FIN X X O X O 
LTU O X O X NR 
LVA O X O X NA 
POL X O O X NA 
PRT O O X N/A N/A 
SVK NA NA NA NA NA 
Note: X = answer was chosen; O = answer was not chosen; N/A = question is not applicable; NA = 
jurisdiction reported that data is not available; NR=no response was provided. 
In Poland the restriction does not apply to all employees, but it includes all civil servants as well as 
management staff (such as directors, heads of divisions or employees with equal levels of remu-
neration). 
The restrictions that apply to employees vary in scope. Finland imposes a duty of 
confidentiality on all employees that leave to work in the private sector. In addi-
tion, Finnish senior directors and tax directors have a cooling-off period of 6 
months. In Latvia, civil servants may not benefit (i.e. work or hold shares) from 
a private company for which they made any decisions during their duty in the 
following 2 years after they quit the tax administration. In Poland and Lithuania 
there are similar regulations to the one in Latvia, but with a shorter period of 1 
year. 
All 4 countries that have restrictions also have provisions for sanctions. In Fin-
land, breach of the duty of confidentiality may lead to fines or imprisonment. In 
Poland, there also might be an arrest penalty. In Latvia and Lithuania, sanctions 
only include future exclusion from public service or fines. In Lithuania, a re-
peated violation may lead to fines up to 580 Euro. 
4.5.3 Summary/Hypotheses 
The data collected in our survey on actual numbers of staff leaving suggests that 
further efforts should be directed at collecting this data more systematically. 
While two countries reported rather low numbers, and one a rather high number, 
the latter used a different definition to answer the question.  
4 countries reported that restrictions such as cooling-off periods are in place, and 
all of them may apply sanctions in case of breaching the restrictions. Yet in two 
countries these sanctions appear to be quite lenient. The absence of any data 
provided on past cases of imposed sanctions might point to a lack of enforce-
ment. Future data gathering efforts might be focused on high risk segments of 
the tax administration, such as tax audits of large multinationals.  
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4.6 Large taxpayer office 
4.6.1 Context 
Size matters with regards to compliance: Large (corporate) taxpayers pose a 
greater risk to a tax administration, since they have more complex structures 
which are more difficult to assess, they can employ specialists that set-up tax 
avoidance strategies, and they often concentrate a significant share of taxable 
revenue of an economy in their hands. In most jurisdictions that are members of 
the OECD, 35% to 50% of total revenue of the tax administrations is managed 
by specific large taxpayer units or programmes of the tax administration 62. Han-
dling the compliance risk of large taxpayers is therefore an important role of the 
tax administration. Therefore, tax administration should spend comparatively 
more resources on enforcing compliance from large taxpayers than from small 
companies. Otherwise corporate taxation risks becoming regressive, with small 
companies facing the highest real burden. 
Many tax administrations have created large taxpayer offices (LTO) that are re-
sponsible for dealing with taxpayers that are considered large due to criteria such 
as their turnover, staff numbers or the sector they operate in. The reason for 
creating such large taxpayer offices is the greater specialization that enables of-
ficers to deal more effectively with those complex, often multinational entities. 
The expertise needed for auditing complex cases can be more efficiently created, 
mobilized and retained in a central unit than in decentralized offices of a tax ad-
ministration. It is important that large taxpayer offices are adequately staffed so 
that they can deal with the difficult task of auditing large companies. 
As mentioned in chapter 4.5 above, problems may arise, however, when a too 
close relationship develops between the large taxpayer officers and the entities 
they audit, i.e. when it becomes difficult to distinguish between the regulators 
and the regulated 63. This problem might be particularly relevant with regards to 
the large taxpayer office. For large companies regulated by the large taxpayer 
office, it might be advantageous to place former employees in precisely those de-
partments and/or to offer tax officers the prospective of joining them in the fu-
ture. Additionally, such phenomenon of “revolving doors” also creates difficulties 
for the tax administration to reserve high qualified staff and an efficient large 
taxpayer office. 
An indication that such an influence is indeed exercised could be a higher turno-
ver of large taxpayer office staff leaving to work for the private sector than in 
other parts of the tax administration or in government. 
The risk for such a “capture” of the large taxpayer office is probably influenced 
by factors such as the percentage of permanent and civil service staff working in 
                                        
62 OECD, Tax Administration 2017, 51. 
63 Meinzer, Steueroase Deutschland. Warum Bei Uns Viele Reiche Keine Steuern Zahlen, 235–62. 
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the LTO, given it is reasonable to assume those might be more committed to 
public service and their work status may reduce the incentive to leave the tax 
administration for the private sector.  
A further risk of regulatory capture might be the practice in which tax admin-
istration staff regularly work on the premises of the companies they audit, espe-
cially if there is no rotation requirement for those tax administration staff work-
ing in the private companies’ premises may thus reduce the risk for revolving 
doors.  
With regards to the Large taxpayer office, our survey asked for the following 
questions: 
1. The number of staff working in the Large Taxpayer Office for each year 
(2015-2017) 
2. The number of new staff recruited in a given year 
3. The number of staff departures in a given year 
4. The number of LTO staff and LTO civil servant staff leaving to work for the 
private sector 
5. The number of civil servant staff 
6. The number of permanent staff 
7. Whether staff usually works on premises of regulated firms 
8. And whether there is a rotation requirement for staff working on firms’ 
premises 
 
4.6.2 Results 
 
Table 8: Responses received – Large taxpayer office 
 CYP FIN LTU LVA POL PRT SVK 
Large taxpayer office Partial Yes Partial Yes No Partial Partial 
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Figure 41: Staff working in the LTO 
  
Note: The numbers in green indicate the percentage of staff that are civil servants. The numbers in 
brown indicate the percentage of staff that are permanent.  
The results indicate that most of the LTO staff are indeed permanent staff and 
civil servants. Between the years 2015-2017, the total staff number (both per-
manent and civil servants) increased in Finland and Slovakia; in Latvia and Por-
tugal numbers decreased and in Lithuania and Cyprus, they remained about sta-
ble. 
To compare the staffing of an LTO between different countries and to have an in-
dication of capacity issues, one can consider the number of FTE compared with 
the number of corporate taxpayers that are managed by the LTO:  
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Figure 42: Number of corporate taxpayers managed by the LTO per FTE 
 
Note: No. of corporate taxpayers managed by the LTO was taken from 64. The data ID is 81230. 
For Poland, no data was available. 
There are considerable differences regarding the number of taxpayers one FTE 
needs to manage within the LTO: ranging from only 5 in Portugal to about 28 in 
Finland. Note that this graph should be read differently than most other graphs 
in this report: A high column rather indicates low capacity and a low column 
shows high capacity (a lot of staff per taxpayer). The differences could, however, 
potentially be explained by different scope of functions of the LTO.  
The following charts represent the percentage of staff that left the LTO and is re-
placed each year, thus not taking into account net increases or decreases in the 
number of staff. In practice, when the number of departures is lower than the 
number of recruitments, then total number of staff is divided by the number of 
departures; when the number of recruitments is lower than the number of depar-
tures, total number of staff is divided by recruitments. 
                                        
64 OECD, Tax Administration 2017 Annex A: Data Tables, 141. 
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Figure 43: Staff exchanged as percentage of total staff in the LTO 
 
Note: Data from Lithuania was left outside, as it also included staff that changes departments 
within the tax administration. For Cyprus and Finland, it remains unclear whether the numbers also 
include staff that changes departments. 
 
On average, between 1 to 6% of LTO staff 
left the unit and were replaced every year, 
dependent on the country. There are nota-
ble differences between countries, with ra-
ther low percentages in Latvia and Portugal 
(in two years 0%) and rather high ones in 
Finland and Slovakia.  
However, the interpretation of the figure is 
not straightforward, as the staff who were 
recruited could be staff who were recruited 
from outside the tax administration or staff 
that change positions within the tax admin-
istration. In Finland around 25% of the people leaving the LTO left to work in the 
private sector each year. Since the departure into the private sector is what mat-
ters with regards to the problem of regulatory capture, staff departures alone are 
a rather unreliable indicator. Staff frequently leaving the LTO and at the same 
time the whole administration could point to the “revolving doors” phenomenon; 
staff rotating within the administration on the other hand could rather reduce the 
risk, as employees do not interact with the same stakeholders for a long period.  
A better indication of “revolving doors” is the percentage of staff that departed 
and actually went to work for the private sector:  
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Figure 44: Staff exchanged as percentage 
of total staff in LTO, average 2015-2017 
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Figure 45: Percentage of staff left working for the private sector - comparing LTO with the whole 
tax administration 
 
Note: Lithuania reported data, which however represented the staff that left the tax administration, 
either to the private sector, or to other sectors, as Lithuania specified they cannot provide the 
number of staff who left only for the private sector. It was therefore left out from the presentation. 
The number of total staff in the tax administration, data was taken from 65. The data ID is 89380. 
Total staff number is only available for year 2015, so the increase or decrease in percentage might 
not be properly reflected.  
Data is not available for Cyprus, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia. 
 
Is the LTO more prone to regulatory capture than other parts of the tax admin-
istration? Since there is data on only three countries, it is difficult to answer this 
question: In Finland, the share of LTO staff that left working in the private sector 
is significantly higher than in the overall tax administration, though not very high 
in total. Portugal reported that no staff at all left the tax administration to work 
for the private sector. This could be caused by cultural issues, as in some Euro-
pean countries, e.g. Portugal, working in the civil service carries a lot of prestige. 
The survey also asked whether LTO staff usually work on the premises of the pri-
vate companies they audit. In Finland, this is the case; for the other 3 countries 
it is not the case. Poland reported that no data is available; Slovak Republic did 
not provide a response. 
                                        
65 OECD, Tax Administration 2017 Annex A: Data Tables, 98. 
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The survey further asked whether 
there is a rotation requirement if 
staff work on firms’ premises. In 
Finland, this is not the case. For the 
other countries the question was not 
applicable. 
4.6.3 Summary/Hypotheses 
The results of our survey indicate 
that most of the LTO staff are per-
manent staff and civil servants. It is 
common practice in only one coun-
try (out of four) that staff works on 
the premises of firms. It is in this 
same country that staff leaving for 
the private sector is considerably 
higher in the LTO than in the rest of the tax administration. This confirms earlier 
findings from a case study in Germany 66, and underlines the need for both more 
systematic data gathering on this point, and for case study research into the re-
lationship between regular on-premise auditing and regulatory capture. 
 
4.7 High Net Worth Individuals 
 
4.7.1 Context 
Next to large companies, the other group of taxpayers with a high risk of non-
compliance are so-called High Net Worth (or sometimes high Net Wealth) individ-
uals (HNWI). The term is usually used for individuals who own financial assets 
worth more than one million dollars 67. A study carried out with data from the 
“Swiss leaks”68 and the “Panama Papers”69 found out that shore tax evasion in-
tensity is indeed a positive function of personal wealth 70. Tax evasion is more 
                                        
66 Meinzer, Steueroase Deutschland. Warum Bei Uns Viele Reiche Keine Steuern Zahlen, 235–62. 
67 Investopedia, ‘High Net Worth Individual - HNWI’, Investopedia, 2018 <https://www.in-
vestopedia.com/terms/h/hnwi.asp> [accessed 23 July 2018]. 
68 In the Swiss leaks, data on accounts and clients of HSBC Private bank, a Switzerland based subsidiary of HSBC, 
showed how this bank helped its clients (among whom were former dictators and arms traffickers) to evade 
taxes ICIJ, ‘Swiss Leaks: Murky Cash Sheltered by Bank Secrecy’, 2018 <https://www.icij.org/investiga-
tions/swiss-leaks/> [accessed 23 July 2018]. 
69 The Panama Papers revealed how the Panama-based law firm Mossack Fonseca spun nets of shell companies 
to help wealthy clients from all over the world evade taxes and launder money ICIJ, ‘The Panama Papers: Ex-
posing the Rogue Offshore Finance Industry’, 2018 <https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/>.. 
70 Annette Alstadsæter, Niels Johannesen and Gabriel Zucman, Tax Evasion and Inequality (2017). 
Figure 46: LTO staff working on the premises of 
the companies they audit 
 
 
Note: NR = No Response; N/A = not applicable 
Numbers are the numbers of jurisdictions that 
provided each response 
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prevalent among wealthy people, as among others, wealth management and off-
shore banking services, that make it possible to evade taxes undetected, are rel-
atively costly and thus not affordable for average taxpayers. Moreover, wealthy 
people tend to earn income from many different sources, which can be more eas-
ily hidden than income from wages whereupon taxes are withheld by the em-
ployer in most countries. Therefore, it is extremely important in order to reduce 
inequalities that tax administrations specifically focus on High Net Worth Individ-
uals. A dedicated High Net Worth Individuals unit can be an effective organiza-
tional structure because it enables to unify relevant skills and knowledge neces-
sary to understand complicated wealth structures (which often involve a deep 
web of shell companies spread in many jurisdictions).  
Hence, some of the same safeguards that apply to an LTO should apply to an 
HNWI unit, as there could also be a risk for capture from private interests. It is 
therefore important to gather data on the number of permanent staff and the 
number of staff who are civil servants as well as on staff who left to work in the 
private sector. 
Thus, similar to the questions asked about the Large Taxpayer Office, the survey 
asked for total number of staff, staff departures and recruitments, as well as for 
numbers of civil servant staff and permanent staff working in the High Net Worth 
Individuals unit. It also asked how many staff members and civil servant staff 
members left to work in the private sector. We did not ask whether tax admin-
istration staff works on the premises of High Net Worth Individuals, as this 
seems rather unlikely in the case of individuals as opposed to firms. 
 
4.7.2 Results 
Table 9: Responses received – High Net Worth Individuals unit 
 CYP FIN LTU LVA POL PRT SVK 
High net worth individual unit No Partial No71 No No72 Partial No 
 
Of the countries surveyed, only Finland and Lithuania reported in the ISORA 
questionnaire that they have a High Net Worth programme 73. Lithuania runs 
such a programme, but there is no dedicated unit. Finland reported a total num-
ber of 10 FTE working in the HNWI unit in 2017, who are all civil servants and 
permanent employees. Portugal created an HNWI unit in 2017 with 9 FTE who 
are all civil servants and permanent employees.  
                                        
71 Lithuania reported that the question was not applicable. 
72 Poland reported that the question was not applicable. 
73 OECD, Tax Administration 2017 Annex A: Data Tables, 145. 
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Both Portugal and Finland reported 
that no staff was recruited nor left 
the tax administration. In Portugal, 
this is probably also due to the fact 
that the HNWI unit was newly cre-
ated and 2017. Therefore, all em-
ployees were newly recruited in 
2017. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.7.3 Summary/Hypotheses 
The evidence collected in this survey is not conclusive, as most data was re-
ported as not available or not applicable. From the responses given to the ISORA 
questionnaire it can be concluded that these countries do not have a specific 
High Net Worth Individuals unit. 
 
4.8 Automatic Exchange of Information 
4.8.1 Context 
Automatic exchange of information is one form of administrative cooperation that 
was developed in order to combat cross-border tax evasion, which occurs when 
taxpayers resident in one country for example use foreign accounts or legal enti-
ties to keep undeclared income and assets hidden from the tax administration. It 
means that tax administrations exchange with each other information necessary 
to assess tax liabilities of its resident taxpayers that arise due to assets and in-
come earned abroad. The information includes for example names and addresses 
of persons owning a bank account or other financial assets in the jurisdictions 
and values of these assets. The standard of automatic exchange of information 
complemented the previous standard of exchange of information upon request, 
where an administration had to formulate a specific request to a foreign admin-
istration in order to obtain information 74.  
                                        
74 Markus Meinzer, ‘Automatic Exchange of Information as the New Global Standard: The End of (Offshore Tax 
Evasion) History?’, SSRN Electronic Journal, 2017 <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2924650> [accessed 21 July 
2017]. 
Figure 47: Staff in HNWI unit 
 
Note: The numbers in green indicate the percent-
age of staff that are civil servants. The numbers in 
brown indicate the percentage of staff that is per-
manent. In Portugal, the HNWI unit is part of the 
LTO. 
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However, the exchanged information is of no use if nothing is done with the in-
formation, i.e. if the administration does not process the data or does not dis-
patch enough staff to analyse data. In fact, it could be a long way from receiving 
raw data from another jurisdiction, to finally claiming and enforcing a potential 
outstanding tax payment: The data received needs to be matched to taxpayers 
registered in the jurisdictions, which could fail due to a falsely declared place of 
residence by the taxpayer 75. 
In its report on the implementation of the directive on administrative coopera-
tion, which provides the legal basis for automatic exchange of information within 
the EU, the European Commission noted that “application of DAC exchange of in-
formation has resulted in a great increase in the amount of data tax administra-
tions have to handle – but on average their capacity to do so has not increased 
at the same rate” 76. 
Indicators for a lack of resources to deal with the data received could be a low 
number of FTE that are responsible for reviewing the data or a high number of 
reports that cannot be matched to any taxpayers or a low number of audits en-
gaged as a result of AEOI data. 
Moreover, jurisdictions are responsible ensuring that the data they send to other 
jurisdictions is of good quality. Therefore, they need to audit financial institutions 
(banks etc.) that report data of foreign taxpayers. They need to make sure, 
among others, that all the necessary data is collected by the financial institu-
tions, that due-diligence-processes are applied, and that data is stored in an ap-
propriate way. Compliance by financial institutions with the requirements of the 
standard is one of the potential Achilles heels of the common reporting standard. 
If a bank does not properly collect data on certain taxpayers, there is no data 
that can subsequently be exchanged.77 
In some jurisdictions, the tax administration is responsible also for auditing the 
reporting financial institutions. 
The survey asked how many staff is employed for processing data received pur-
suant to the common reporting standard. It further asked for information on the 
number of taxpayers for whom data was sent and received in 2017; how many of 
the reports received could not be matched to any registered taxpayer; how often 
                                        
75 Andres Knobel and Frederik Heitmüller, Citizenship and Residency by Investment Schemes: Potential to Avoid 
the Common Reporting Standard for Automatic Exchange of Information, 2018 <http://taxjustice.wpen-
gine.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/20180305_Citizenship-and-Residency-by-Investment-FINAL.pdf> [ac-
cessed 21 August 2018]. 
76 European Commission, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUN-
CIL on the Application of Council Directive (EU) 2011/16/EU on Administrative Cooperation in the Field of Direct 
Taxation. (Brussels, 2017), 3 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52017DC0781> 
[accessed 6 August 2018]. 
77 https://www.taxjustice.net/2018/07/11/its-time-for-countries-to-start-publishing-the-data-theyre-collecting-
under-oecds-common-reporting-standard/; 15.8.2018.s 
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“reporting financial institutions” were audited by the tax administration and for 
how many taxpayers additional audits have been launched as a result of data re-
ceived through AEOI in 2017. Finally, it was asked whether the jurisdiction was 
willing to release aggregated statistics (on a country basis) on AEOI.     
 
4.8.2 Results 
Table 10: Responses received – Automatic exchange of information 
 CYP FIN LTU LVA POL PRT SVK 
Automatic exchange of informa 
Tion Partial Partial Yes Partial Yes Partial Partial 
 
 
Figure 48: Number of taxpayers for whom account data was received/sent pursuant to CRS 
 
 
Note: Poland reported the number of reports that were received/sent, and not the number of tax-
payers on whom reports were received/sent. Thus, the number is not comparable with the other 
jurisdictions. Poland reported the reception of 235,690 and the sending 42,302 reports.  
 
 
 
Figure 49: Number of staff responsible for pro-
cessing and reviewing AEOI data 
Figure 50: No. of staff responsible for AEOI di-
vided by number of taxpayers for whom AEOI 
data was received in 2017 
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Poland receives significantly more data than it sends. All other countries send 
more data than they receive. Both Cyprus and Latvia seem not to have FTE that 
are responsible for reviewing and processing the data received. Comparatively, 
Lithuania has dispatched the highest amount of staff to analyse data in relation 
to the number of taxpayers for whom reports were received. It needs to be noted 
that fewer staff numbers responsible for data might also indicate that the juris-
diction relies more on technology and uses more advanced computer technology 
to analyse the data. 
The survey asked for how many accounts the data received could not be 
matched to any tax residents in the jurisdictions. Lithuania reported that this was 
the case for 73 taxpayers, i.e. approximately 4%. All other jurisdictions reported 
that the data is either not available or that the matching was still being pro-
cessed at the moment the survey was filled in. 
The Lithuanian tax authority au-
dits once per year whether re-
porting financial institutions cor-
rectly implement the common re-
porting standard. Cyprus and Lat-
via reported 0 audits were under-
taken; Poland, Finland and Slo-
vakia reported that this infor-
mation was not available. Portu-
gal reported the question was not 
applicable. 
The survey finally asked for how 
many taxpayers audits have been 
 
 
Note: Latvia reported not available. In Portugal, 
the personnel responsible for CRS [common re-
porting standard] is also responsible for all the 
administrative cooperation, meaning also for 
CBCR for example. 
 
 
 
Note: The figures are calculated with data from 
figure 48 and 49. The notes from these tables 
apply here as well.  
Figure 51: Audit of CRS implementation by ‘reporting 
financial institutions’ in 2017 
 
 
Note: NA = Not available; N/A = Not applicable 
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initiated as a result of account data received under the common reporting stand-
ard. This was the case in Finland and Lithuania, where about 1000 and 90 audits 
respectively were initiated in 2017. Portugal noted that data is currently still be-
ing processed. All other countries reported that no audits were initiated because 
of account data received.  
4.8.3 Summary/Hypotheses 
As the automatic exchange of information has been implemented only recently 
by the surveyed countries, the evidence is not conclusive. Nevertheless, it is 
noteworthy that audits of ‘reporting financial institutions’ have not been under-
taken by tax administrations with the exception of one country. In a few cases 
that could be due to the fact that another government department than the tax 
administration is responsible for auditing the ‘reporting financial institutions’. 
Desk research has revealed that it is difficult to find out which institution is re-
sponsible for auditing compliance by ‘reporting financial institutions’. Subsequent 
surveys should gather this information directly from tax administrations. 
It needs further to be noted, that only in one country (Finland), additional audits 
have been launched, which might be explained by the fact that the review proce-
dures are still under way in other jurisdictions. If similarly low numbers are re-
ported in future surveys, however, this might indicate a lack of capacity to ana-
lyse and act upon the received data effectively. 
It is encouraging that Lithuania succeeded in matching 93% of the data, which is 
among the highest matching ratios for tax records under cross-border automatic 
information exchange on record 78. 
4.9 CBCR 
4.9.1 Context 
The introduction of country by country reporting is one of the recommendations 
of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) plan by the OECD. Multinational 
companies that are headquartered in one of the participating jurisdictions now 
need to submit a report to the tax administration containing information about its 
profits, capital, assets and employees separately for each jurisdiction it operates 
in. The tax administration then shares the country by country reports with all the 
jurisdictions with whom it has entered into an agreement and which are men-
tioned in the country by country report. Alternatively, some jurisdictions require 
CBCR reports directly from subsidiaries of multinational enterprises if they cannot 
                                        
78 Markus Meinzer, Towards Multilateral Automatic Information Exchange. Current Practice of AIE in Selected 
Countries, Tax Justice Network (London, 2012), 19, 65–66 <http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/up-
load/pdf/AIE2012-TJN-Briefing.pdf> [accessed 14 February 2013]. 
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obtain a report through automatic information exchange 79. The aim of the meas-
ure is to provide tax administrations with the means to better understand where 
a multinational company generates added value so that it can better evaluate 
transfer prices and counter tax avoidance schemes. 
For the exchange of country by country reports to be effective, however, it is im-
portant that the tax administration properly analyses the reports received and 
use the data in audits. A practice of a tax haven jurisdiction engaging in a strat-
egy of “mock compliance”80 81 might consist in complying (on paper) with the 
OECD BEPS recommendations and exchanging country by country reports, yet 
failing to make any use of the data received subsequently.  
Indicators whether a tax administration indeed uses country by country reporting 
data could be the allocation of human resources compared to the number of re-
ports received as well as the number of additional audits engaged after the anal-
ysis of country by country reports. 
The survey first asked whether the tax administration has established a dedi-
cated service and how many staff is employed for processing CBCR data. It fur-
ther asked for information on the number of taxpayers for whom data was sent 
and received in 2017 and for how many taxpayers additional audits have been 
launched as a result of exchanged country-by-country reports in 2017. Finally, it 
was asked whether the jurisdiction was willing to release further statistics on 
CBCR. 
4.9.2 Results 
Table 11: Responses received – Country by country reporting 
 CYP FIN LTU LVA POL PRT SVK 
Country by country reporting Yes Partial Partial Yes Yes Yes Partial 
 
                                        
79 Andres Knobel and Alex Cobham, ‘COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING: HOW RESTRICTED ACCESS EXACER-
BATES GLOBAL INEQUALITIES IN TAXING RIGHTS’, 2016 <https://www.taxjustice.net/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/12/Access-to-CbCR-Dec16-1.pdf> [accessed 9 February 2017]; Tax Justice Network, Financial Se-
crecy Index 2018 - Methodology (London, 2018), 77–84 <https://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/PDF/FSI-
Methodology.pdf> [accessed 14 February 2018]. 
80 „Mock compliance occurs when someone fulfils the formal requirements of a standard, for instance by ratify-
ing a treaty, but fails to deliver on its substance, for instance by dragging his feet on enforcement.” Peter Di-
etsch, ‘Whose Tax Base? The Ethics of Global Tax Governance’, in Global Tax Governance – What Is Wrong with 
It, and How to Fix It, ed. by Peter Dietsch and Thomas Rixen (Colchester, 2016), 240.. 
81 Richard Woodward, ‘A Strange Revolution: Mock Compliance and the Failure of the OECD’s International Tax 
Transparency Regime’, in Global Tax Governance – What Is Wrong with It, and How to Fix It, ed. by Thomas 
Rixen and Peter Dietsch (Colchester, 2016), 103–22. 
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Figure 52: Establishment of dedicated ser-
vice to manage CBCR data 
 
 
Figure 53: Number of staff responsible for processing 
CBCR data 
 
 
Note: Lithuania reported not applicable, Latvia re-
ported that the exchange was not carried out yet. In 
Portugal, staff responsible for CBCR is also responsi-
ble for other tasks of administrative cooperation, for 
example under the common reporting standard. 
 
5 jurisdictions have established a dedicated service to manage CBCR data. Portu-
gal reported that it is not yet established (implying that it is planned). Slovakia 
did not provide a response. 
The survey also asked, for how 
many taxpayers CBCR data was 
sent to other jurisdictions. No ju-
risdictions however has already 
sent out any CBCR data. The 
number of taxpayers for whom 
data was received varies between 
0 in Poland and Slovakia and 56 
in Finland. One further difficulty is 
the lack of availability of statistics 
on the hypothetical number for 
how many taxpayers data should 
be received. Such information 
should be gathered in subsequent 
research in order to compare 
problems with the implementation of country by country reporting exchanges. 
Finally, the survey asked for how many taxpayers any kind of audit has been ini-
tiated as a result of CBCR reports received. This has not been the case anywhere 
so far. 
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Figure 54: Number of taxpayers for whom CBCR data 
was received 
 
 
Note: Lithuania reported not applicable, Latvia re-
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4.9.3 Summary/Hypotheses 
Almost all of the jurisdictions have established a dedicated service and reserved 
staff for managing and analysing data from country by country reports. In some 
countries, this number is rather low, though, with sometimes only 1 FTE. Given 
the recent implementation of country by country reporting, the evidence should 
not be treated as conclusive yet, but it is necessary to monitor the use of CBCR 
data, in order to assess the effectiveness of the measure. 
Conclusions 
This report discussed issues of the evaluation of tax administration capacity, with 
a special focus on the capacity to combat tax evasion and tax avoidance and thus 
reduce inequality. In that context, it assessed what data is available to compare 
EU member states with each other and identified further interesting issues that 
were not covered by the various available surveys on tax administration. To ad-
dress these issues, a new survey was designed and sent to the tax administra-
tions of all EU member states. Seven jurisdictions provided answers. Although 
the data they provided may not be sufficient to draw final conclusions about the 
capacity of all EU tax jurisdictions, especially as taking into account many inter-
vening factors such as tax policy variables or voluntary compliance by taxpayers 
would be necessary, it gives an indication about which hypotheses are worth pur-
suing more in-depth in a future research. 
With regards to audit activity, a decline in the practice of auditing tax returns 
could be observed, as well as a decline in the number of on-site audits in two out 
of three countries. Further research should investigate how this decline can be 
explained. Potential hypotheses include lower budgets or political interference 
(“tax haven” state strategy, “mock compliance”), but also a greater reliance on 
IT and data analysis solutions or pre-populated tax returns. 
Qualitative research should be conducted into the practices of imposing penalties 
and penalty collection. The data from the survey revealed that there are im-
portant differences between countries concerning the imposition of penalties, 
both in value as in number. It has also revealed that the effective collection of 
penalties seems to be a problematic issue, as neither of the three jurisdictions 
that reported data succeeded in collecting more than 50% of the penalties that 
were charged in any of the years. Further research could explore what stands in 
the way of an effective collection of penalties. As only few cases that have been 
referred to criminal prosecutions were finalised in the responding jurisdictions, it 
would be interesting to further investigate why this is the case. Is this an issue of 
the court system? Or do tax administrations lack the power to assemble the nec-
essary evidence, or might there be more political reasons for a lack of enforce-
ment? 
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The research also reveals that the protection of whistleblowers within tax admin-
istrations is still not achieved among tax administrations. We recommend all ad-
ministrations to consider the introduction of specific laws that protect whistle-
blowers who reveal illicit practices from prosecution. 
Somewhat less fruitful seems to be the “revolving door” hypothesis. At least in 
the countries that participated in the survey, the number of employees leaving 
the tax administration (or in particular the large taxpayer office), seems to be ra-
ther small. However, this survey did not assess the number of employees who 
joined the tax administration coming from the private sector (albeit this might be 
primarily a problematic issue with regards to higher, more political positions).  
The data obtained on the implementation of automatic information exchange and 
country by country reporting is not yet conclusive (also due to the relatively re-
cent implementation of the standards). Nevertheless, it is important to conduct 
further studies and to assess whether these legal tools are effectively used (and 
usable) by tax administrations in order to combat tax evasion and tax avoidance. 
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Annex A: Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
 
  
               
    Tax Administration Questionnaire 
 
Instructions 
1. Please read the questions carefully and answer in the yellow colored area dedicated for 
each answer. Please note that in certain cases -where we specified- some of the questions 
can be skipped if the answer to the previous question was not applicable or not affirmative. 
2.  In cases where information is not available, please write 'Not Available' or 'NA' in the dedi-
cated place for the answer. 
 
ID Topic Question Info 
Answer 
Criteria/Detail    
                
1 Number of 
Desk Audits 
For each of 
the following 
criteria, please 
provide the 
number of 
desk audits 
(please see 
'annex A' for 
term clarifica-
tions) for the 
years 2015-
2017. 
  2015 2016 2017 
1.a Total number of 
Desk audits.  
      
1.b Number of Desk 
audits regarding 
Personal In-
come Tax (PIT). 
      
1.c Number of Desk 
audits regarding 
Corporate In-
come Tax (CIT). 
      
1.d Number of Desk 
audits regarding 
Value Added 
Tax (VAT). 
      
               
2 Audits of Tax 
Returns 
2.1 How many 
of the total 
submitted tax 
  2015 2016 2017 
2.1.a       
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returns were 
audited by the 
tax admin-
istration (ra-
ther than only 
self-assessed 
by the taxpay-
ers) in each of 
the years 
2015-2017?    
Please specify in 
absolute num-
bers.              
2.1.b Please specify in 
percentage of 
total tax re-
turns.      
      
2.1.c …of which relat-
ing to PIT. 
Please specify in 
absolute num-
bers.  
      
2.1.d …of which relat-
ing to PIT. 
Please specify in 
percentage of 
total PIT tax re-
turns. 
      
2.1.e …of which relat-
ing to CIT. 
Please specify in 
absolute num-
bers.  
      
2.1.f …of which relat-
ing to CIT. 
Please specify in 
percentage of 
total CIT tax re-
turns. 
      
2.1.g …of which relat-
ing to VAT. 
Please specify in 
absolute num-
bers.  
      
2.1.h …of which relat-
ing to VAT. 
Please specify in 
percentage of 
total VAT tax re-
turns. 
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3 Administrative 
Penalties Im-
posed 
3.1 For each of 
following cri-
teria please in-
dicate the 
number (fre-
quency) and 
value (mone-
tary amounts) 
of administra-
tive penalties 
imposed for 
taxpayer non-
disclo-
sure/false dis-
closure of tax-
able income or 
expenditures 
for each of the 
years 2015-
2017.  
  2015 2016 2017 
3.1.a Total number of 
administrative 
penalties due.   
      
3.1.b Total value of 
administrative 
penalties due. 
      
3.1.c ...Of which 
number of ad-
ministrative 
penalties relat-
ing to PIT. 
      
3.1.d ...Of which 
value of admin-
istrative penal-
ties relating to 
PIT. 
      
3.1.e ...Of which 
number of ad-
ministrative 
penalties relat-
ing to CIT. 
      
3.1.f ...Of which 
value of admin-
istrative penal-
ties relating to 
CIT. 
      
3.1.g ...Of which 
number of ad-
ministrative 
penalties relat-
ing to VAT. 
      
3.1.h ...Of which 
value of admin-
istrative penal-
ties relating to 
VAT. 
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4 Administrative 
Penalties Col-
lected 
 4.1. For each 
of following 
criteria please 
indicate the 
percentage of 
administrative 
penalties (re-
ferred in ques-
tion 3 above) 
collected so 
far, sorted ac-
cording to the 
years in which 
the penalties 
were imposed.   
4.1.a The percentage 
of total adminis-
trative penalties 
collected so far.  
      
4.1.b The percentage 
of administra-
tive penalties 
relating to PIT 
collected so far.  
      
4.1.c The percentage 
of administra-
tive penalties 
relating to CIT 
collected so far.  
      
4.1.d The percentage 
of administra-
tive penalties 
relating to VAT 
collected so far.  
      
  
5 Prosecutions   5.1 For each of 
the following 
criteria, please 
provide the 
number of 
criminal tax in-
vestigations 
referred for 
prosecution 
during the 
years 2015-
2017.  
    2015 2016 2017 
5.1.a Total number of 
criminal tax in-
vestigations re-
ferred to prose-
cution. 
      
5.1.b Number of crim-
inal tax investi-
gations of PIT 
referred to 
prosecution. 
      
5.1.c Number of crim-
inal tax investi-
gations of CIT 
referred to 
prosecution. 
      
5.1.d Number of crim-
inal tax investi-
gations of VAT 
referred to 
prosecution. 
      
5.2 For each of 
the following 
criteria, please 
provide the 
  2015 2016 2017 
5.2.a Total number of 
criminal tax in-
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number of 
criminal tax in-
vestigations fi-
nalised 
through pros-
ecution during 
the years 
2015-2017.  
vestigations fi-
nalised through 
prosecution.  
5.2.b Number of crim-
inal tax investi-
gations of PIT fi-
nalised through 
prosecution. 
      
5.2.c Number of crim-
inal tax investi-
gations of CIT fi-
nalised through 
prosecution. 
      
5.2.d Number of crim-
inal tax investi-
gations of VAT 
finalised 
through prose-
cution. 
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6 Whiste-
blower  pro-
tection  
and reward  
6.1 Does the 
jurisdiction of-
fer specific le-
gal protection 
for whistle-
blowers in the 
tax admin-
istration (both 
permanent 
and contrac-
tual employ-
ees) who re-
port on and/or 
publish cases 
of serious vio-
lations of the 
law (e.g. politi-
cal interfer-
ence, disrup-
tion of proce-
dure, abuse of 
office, tax eva-
sion, bribery, 
etc) within the 
tax admin-
istration?  
6.1.a Yes (please de-
scribe the type 
pf legal protec-
tion and provide 
a link or refer-
ence to the 
source of infor-
mation). 
  
6.1.b No   
6.2 Were 
there any 
cases where 
serious viola-
tions of the 
law were re-
vealed as a re-
sult of whistle-
blowers who 
were tax ad-
ministration's 
staff?  
6.2.a Yes (please pro-
vide details on 
the cases and a 
link or reference 
to the source of 
information). 
  
6.2.b No   
6.3 Are whis-
tleblowers at 
the tax admin-
istration ex-
posed to 
prison terms 
for breaching 
confidentiality 
laws or con-
tracts ?   
6.3.a Yes (please pro-
vide a link or 
reference to the 
source of infor-
mation). 
  
6.3.b No   
6.4.a   
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6.4 Were 
there any 
cases in the 
past where 
whistleblow-
ers were sanc-
tioned (e.g. 
fired or impris-
oned) for di-
vulging or 
publicly dis-
closing confi-
dential infor-
mation? 
Yes (please pro-
vide details on 
the cases and a 
link or reference 
to the source of 
information). 
6.4.b No   
      
7 Staff metrics 
in Large Tax-
payer Office / 
Programme 
 7.1 For each 
of following 
criteria, please 
provide details 
on the number 
of staff work-
ing in the large 
taxpayer of-
fice/pro-
gramme (LTO) 
in the years 
2015-2017. If 
your jurisdic-
tion doesn't 
have an LTO, 
please write 
'Not- applica-
ble' under 
each of the 
years 2015-
2017.  
  2015 2016 2017 
7.1.a Total number of 
staff (in FTE) 
working in the 
LTO at the end 
of the year.  
      
7.1.b Number of staff 
departures in 
the LTO during 
the year. 
      
7.1.c Number of staff 
recruitments in 
the LTO during 
the year. 
      
7.1.d Number of civil 
servant staff* 
(in FTE) working 
in the LTO at 
the end of the 
year. 
      
7.1.e Number of per-
manent staff* 
(in FTE) working 
in the LTO at 
the end of the 
year. 
      
[please skip if 
the answer to 
7.1 above is 
not applica-
ble]       7.2 Is 
it a common 
practice for 
7.2.a Yes   
7.2.b No   
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tax admin-
istration staff 
working in the 
LTO to be 
working on an 
ongoing basis 
on the prem-
ises of private 
companies 
they audit? 
[please skip if 
the answer to 
7.2. above is 
No]                       
7.3 Is there 
any rotation 
requirement 
for those tax 
administration 
staff working 
on the prem-
ises of the pri-
vate compa-
nies (e.g. a 
maximum 
number of 
months/years 
the tax admin-
istration audi-
tor can work 
on the audit of 
the same large 
taxpayer)? 
7.3.a Yes (please de-
scribe them or 
provide a link to 
the source of in-
formation). 
  
7.3.b  No   
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8  Staff met-
rics in High 
Net Wealth 
Individuals 
Unit or pro-
gramme 
8.1 For each of 
following crite-
ria please pro-
vide the number 
of staff working 
in the High Net 
Wealth Individ-
uals (HNWIs) 
unit/pro-
gramme at the 
end of the years 
2015-2017. If 
you don't have 
an HNWIs 
unit/pro-
gramme, please 
write 'Not- ap-
plicable' under 
each of the 
years 2015-
2017.  
  2015 2016 2017 
8.1.a Total number of 
staff (in FTE) 
working in the 
HNWIs unit/pro-
gramme at the 
end of the year. 
      
8.1.b Number of staff 
departures in 
the HNWIs 
unit/pro-
gramme during 
the year. 
      
8.1.c Number of staff 
recruitments in 
the HNWIs 
unit/pro-
gramme during 
the year. 
      
8.1.d Number of civil 
servant staff* 
(in FTE) working 
in the HNWIs 
unit/pro-
gramme. 
      
8.1.e Number of per-
manent staff* 
(in FTE) working 
at the HNWIs 
unit/pro-
gramme. 
      
  
9 Staff mobil-
ity between 
the private 
and public 
sectors  
9.1 For each of 
the years 2015-
2017, please 
mention the to-
tal number of 
tax administra-
tion's staff who 
left the tax ad-
ministration for 
working in the 
private sector.  
  2015 2016 2017 
9.1.a Total number of 
tax administra-
tion's staff who 
left for working 
in the private 
sector. 
      
9.1.b Total number of 
tax administra-
tion's civil serv-
ant staff who 
left for working 
in the private 
sector. 
      
9.1.c       
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Number of 
LTO's total staff 
who left for 
working in the 
private sector. 
9.1.d Number of 
LTO's civil serv-
ants staff who 
left for working 
in the private 
sector. 
      
9.1.e Number of 
HNWIs 
unit/pro-
gramme's total 
staff who left 
for working in 
the private sec-
tor. 
      
9.1.f Number of 
HNWIs 
unit/pro-
gramme's civil 
servants staff 
who left for 
working in the 
private sector. 
      
9.2 Are there 
any restrictions 
imposed by law 
or regulation for 
tax administra-
tion's staff who 
leave the tax ad-
ministration for 
working in the 
private sector 
(e.g. cooling-off 
periods)?  
9.2.a Yes, for all types 
of staff (please 
specify the re-
striction or pro-
vide a refer-
ence). 
  
9.2.b Yes, only for 
civil servants 
staff (please 
specify the re-
striction or pro-
vide a refer-
ence). 
  
9.2.c No   
9.3.a   
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[please skip if 
the answer to 
9.2 above is No]                        
9.3 Are there 
any criminal 
sanctions or ad-
ministrative 
sanctions (e.g. 
fines, loss of 
pension rights) 
or other sanc-
tions (e.g. depri-
vation of profes-
sional license) 
for violation of 
these re-
strictions?  
Yes. Please 
specify the 
sanction and 
provide a refer-
ence. 
9.3.b No   
[please skip if 
the answer to 
9.2 above is No]                        
9.4 Were there 
any cases of vio-
lation of these 
restrictions in 
the past by tax 
administration's 
staff from 2015 
to 2017? 
9.4.a Yes. Please 
specify and pro-
vide a refer-
ence. 
  
9.4.b No   
    
        2015 2016 2017 
10 Automatic 
Information 
Exchange 
10.1 Please pro-
vide the number 
of staff (in FTE) 
responsible for 
processing and 
reviewing the 
account data re-
ceived through 
the implemen-
tation of the 
Common Re-
porting Stand-
ard (CRS) at the 
end of the year 
2017. 
10.1.a Please specify in 
absolute num-
bers. 
    
10.2 Please 
specify the total 
10.2.a Number of tax-
payers for 
whom account 
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number of tax-
payers for 
whom account 
data was re-
ceived from or 
sent to a foreign 
tax administra-
tion with an ac-
tivated CRS ex-
change relation-
ship at the end 
of the year 
2017. 
data was re-
ceived. 
10.2.b Number of tax-
payers for 
whom account 
data was sent. 
  
10.3 Please pro-
vide the number 
of taxpayers for 
whom the ac-
count data re-
ceived through 
CRS exchange 
relationship for 
year 2017 could 
not be matched 
so far by the tax 
administration 
to any tax resi-
dent. 
10.3.a Please specify in 
absolute num-
bers.  
 
10.4 How often 
did the tax ad-
ministration au-
dit the imple-
mentation of 
the CRS (domes-
tic legislation 
and regulation) 
by reporting fi-
nancial institu-
tions during the 
year 2017?  
10.4.a If the tax admin-
istration is not 
responsible for 
this task, please 
write Not Appli-
cable. 
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10.5 Please 
specify the 
number of tax-
payers about 
whom any type 
of audit has 
been initiated 
by the tax ad-
ministration 
based on the ac-
count data re-
ceived through 
CRS exchange 
relationship for 
the year 2017. 
10.5.a Please specify in 
absolute num-
bers. Please see 
'annex A' for 
clarifications of 
the different 
types of audits.  
 
  
10.6 Would the 
tax administra-
tion be willing 
to release more 
detailed aggre-
gate data along 
our proposal for 
statistics tem-
plate: 
https://www.ta
xjustice.net/wp-
content/up-
loads/2013/04/
AEoI-Statistics-
Explanation-
with-pro-
posal.pdf? 
10.6.a Yes. Please pro-
vide a contact 
person with 
whom we can 
follow up on 
this. 
  
10.6.b No.   
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11 Country- by- 
Country Re-
porting  
11.1 Has the tax 
administration 
established a 
dedicated ser-
vice to manage 
data received 
through Coun-
try-by-Country 
Reporting 
(CBCR)?  
11.1.a Yes   
11.1.b No   
11.2 Please pro-
vide the number 
of staff (in FTE) 
responsible for 
reviewing the 
data received 
through CBCR at 
the end of the 
year 2017. 
  2015 2016 2017 
11.2.a Please specify in 
absolute num-
bers. 
    
11.3 Please 
specify the total 
number of tax-
payers for 
whom CBCR 
data was re-
ceived from or 
sent to a foreign 
tax authority at 
the end of the 
year 2017. 
11.3.a Number of tax-
payers for 
whom data was 
received. 
  
11.3.b Number of tax-
payers for 
whom data was 
sent. 
  
11.4 Please 
specify the 
number of tax-
payers about 
whom any type 
of audit has 
been initiated 
by the tax ad-
ministration 
based on the 
data received 
through CBCR 
for the year 
2017. 
11.4.a Please specify in 
absolute num-
bers. Please see 
'annex A' for 
clarifications of 
the different 
types of audits.  
  
11.5 Would the 
tax administra-
tion be willing 
to release coun-
try level aggre-
gates of CBCR 
11.5.a Yes. Please pro-
vide a contact 
person with 
whom we can 
follow up on 
this. 
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data, to be filed 
in http://data-
fortaxjus-
tice.net/? 
11.5.b No   
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Annex B: Glossary 
 
Glossary  
Administrative Penalties Civil sanction imposed on the violation of 
an act, regulation or the law which is not 
considered a crime, and is designed to 
secure compliance.  
Desk audits Intervention usually resulting from an in-
office review of information returned by 
the taxpayer and normally takes the 
form of further written or telephonic en-
quiries.  
Full Time Equivalent 
(FTE)  
An FTE of 100% means resources equal 
to one staff member available for one 
full year working full time (regardless of 
role).    
  
 
 
   Abbreviations  
CBCR Country-by-Country Reporting 
CIT Corporate Income Tax 
CRS Common Reporting Standard 
FTE Full Time Equivalent 
HNWIs High Net Wealth Individuals 
LTO Large Tax Office/Programme 
PIT Personal Income Tax 
VAT Value Added Tax 
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